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INTRODUCTION

Professors Ramona Paetzold and Steven Willborn recently explored
the disparate impact model of employment discrimination in Deconstructing Disparate Impact: A View of the Model Through New
Lenses, published in the North Carolina Law Review.' They approached the model from the perspective of what they termed two
"new lenses": the concurrence and stratification lenses. 2 Both lenses
address matters of causation and both appear to be responses to questions raised by the Supreme Court's opinion in Wards Cove Packing
Co. v. Antonio,3 and by the partial internment and partial codification
of Wards Cove by the Civil Rights Act of 1991.4
As a generalization, the disparate impact model prohibits employer
use of status-neutral employment criteria that generate a disparate adverse effect by race, gender, etcetera, 5 unless the criteria are justified
by "business necessity."'6 In Wards Cove, the plaintiff attacked the defendant-employer's employee selection practices by comparing the
composition of the employer's two work force categories: cannery
workers (predominately nonwhite) and noncannery workers (predominately white). 7 The Supreme Court rejected this comparison as not
probative on two grounds: (1) the cannery work force was not a
"qualified labor pool" from which the noncannery work force was selected, and (2) the plaintiff had not identified particular neutral employment criteria and established that the criteria generated a
disparate effect. 8 The first of these grounds is somewhat opaque, but
a potential explanation is that a plaintiff must control for qualifications not in dispute, including, perhaps, ones not expressly required by
the defendant. 9 Call this the comparability implication: to determine
1. Ramona L. Paetzold & Steven L. Willbom, Deconstructing DisparateImpact- A View of the
Model Through New Lenses, 74 N.C. L. REV. 325 (1996).
2. Id. at 331-51.
3. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
4. Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 105, 105 Stat. 1071, 1074 (1991).
5. The extent of the etcetera is unclear. For example, the impact model may not be available
in the context of age discrimination.
6. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
7. 490 U.S. at 647-50. Although the plaintiffs identified a number of challenged practices, they

sought to establish disparate effect through evidence of "bottom line" imbalance: cannery workers were predominately nonwhite and noncannery workers predominately white. Id. at 657.
They failed to present evidence of the causal relationship between the challenged practices and
allegedly unlawful "effect." See id.

8. Id. at 651-58.
9. This is a potential explanation because the Court indicated in part that the cannery workers
were not qualified for skilled noncannery positions and in part that self-selection might explain
the absence of nonwhites in unskilled noncannery positions. Id. at 653-54. This may mean that
the plaintiff must control for undisputed qualifications-those not challenged but expressly re-
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whether a neutral criterion has a disparate effect, the persons subjected to it must be otherwise comparable or homogeneous. Professors Paetzold and Willborn treat this implication through their
"stratification lens": it is possible that the observed disparate effect of

an employer requirement (e.g., an employment test) is attributable to
an antecedent cause (e.g., differences in education level or quality of
education) not expressly identified as a criterion.' 0 If data is disaggregated (stratified) to account for this antecedent cause, substantial disparities in majority-group/minority-group performance under the
employer's requirement may disappear. 1 In their view, this form of
"stratification" is or should normally be ignored for prima facie case
purposes under the disparate impact model: the employer faces liability for use of the test regardless of the antecedent reasons for the test's
12
disparate effect.
Congress purported to "overrule" Wards Cove in the Civil Rights
Act of 1991.13 However, the 1991 Act partially codifies Wards Cove
by incorporating the Supreme Court's requirement that the plaintiff
identify the particular criterion attacked and establish that the criterion caused a disparate impact. 14 The 1991 Act creates an exception if
criteria "are not capable of separation for analysis."'1 5 An ambiguity
in the Act is the meaning and scope of this exception.' 6 Professors
quired-and for other variables that are not attributable to employer "discrimination." However, the Court's perception of undisputed qualifications appears to have been a broad one,
potentially including qualifications not expressly required by an employer, because one of the
plaintiff's complaints was the employer's failure to utilize objective criteria. Id. at 647. An implication is that the Court was insisting upon a statistical comparison of homogeneous workers or
applicants. See Allen v. Seidman, 881 F.2d 375, 378-79 (7th Cir. 1989) (suggesting this interpretation of Wards Cove but finding homogeneity under the facts of the case).
10. Paetzold & Willborn, supra note 1, at 336-42.
11. Id. at 338-39.
12. Id. at 353-56. But see id. at 387-97 (exploring possible legitimate uses of stratification).
The authors' analysis of stratification is addressed later in this article. See infra notes 232-49 and
accompanying text.
13. Public Law No. 102-166, § 2, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991). The cited findings section declares that
Wards Cove weakened the scope and effectiveness of Title VII. Id. Section 105 of the Act,
codifying the impact model, declares that an interpretive memorandum is the exclusive legislative history, and that memorandum declares that the terms "business necessity" and "job related" in the Act "reflect the concepts enunciated by the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), and in other Supreme Court decisions prior to Wards Cove
Packing Co. v. Antonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989)." 137 CONG. REC. S15276 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1991)
(Statement of Sen. Danforth).
14. Civil Rights Act (Title VII) § 703(k), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (1994).
15. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(B)(i).
16. Moreover, while the Act clearly overturns another aspect of Wards Cove by placing the
burden of persuasion on the defendant to establish "business necessity," 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2(k)(B)(i), it is ambiguous in further respects. The Court had defined the content of business
necessity in Wards Cove as neither requiring "essentiality" nor permitting "insubstantial justifica-
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Paetzold and Willborn address the 1991 Act's exception to the requirement of plaintiff identification of a particular criterion and proof
of its disparate effect through their "concurrence lens": multiple criteria may generate a disparate effect only when considered jointly, so
the exception should be read as deeming such a joint effect an instance of inseparability. 17 Moreover, a particular criterion may generate a disparate effect where this effect is disguised by the effects of
other criteria, and the disparate effect of the particular criterion
18
should be deemed an instance of separability.
The concurrence and stratification "lenses" identified by Professor
Paetzold and Willborn are valuable clarifications of phenomena that
readings of the impact model must confront and are significant contributions to scholarship addressing the model. This response disputes
neither the facts of such phenomena nor their importance to the legal
causation questions raised by these authors. The response disputes,
rather, the implications the authors wish to derive from the lenses or,
perhaps, the framework from which they approach the lenses. As this
framework is consistent with that offered by Julie Allen and Professors Ronald Allen and Mayer Freed (hereinafter "the Allen authors")
in A Positive Theory of the Employment DiscriminationCases19 published in The Journal of CorporationLaw, this response disputes that
positive theory as well.
The framework is this: the impact model is "blind" to antecedent
causes and to actual impact upon actual employees or applicants, so
the model protects individuals; it is not an equal achievement for
groups model; it is not a model attacking only "barriers" to employment attributable to particular instances of societal discrimination;
and it is not a device for prohibiting disparate treatment.20 Rather,
tions." 490 U.S. at 659. The Act merely repeats pre-Wards Cove judicial language regarding the
defense: a "challenged practice" must be "job related for the position in question and consistent

with business necessity." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(B)(i). Even if the Act is viewed as wiping
Wards Cove from "the books," this would be ambiguous, as prior case law supports both strict
(difficult to establish) and relaxed (not difficult to establish) versions of the defense. Compare
Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 430-36 (1975) (requiring strict compliance with
validation standards of E.E.O.C. Selection Guidelines), with New York Transit Auth. v. Beazer,
440 U.S. 568, 587 n.31 (1979) (finding that a criterion has a manifest relationship to employment
if it significantly serves a legitimate employment goal even if not required by that goal), and
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 250-51 (1976) (ignoring the validation requirement and employing a reasonable relationship test).
17. Paetzold & Willborn, supra note 1, at 356-64, 383-84.
18. Id. at 381.
19. Julie 0. Allen et al., A Positive Theory of the Employment Discrimination Cases, 16 J.
CORP. L. 173 (1991). Professors Paetzold and Willborn also recognize the similarity. Paetzold &
Willborn, supra note 1, at 374 n.163.
20. Paetzold & Willborn, supra note 1, at 370-74.
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the model is what the Supreme Court said it was in Griggs v. Duke
Power Co.:21 a prohibition of "unnecessary" barriers to minority employment. 22 The response is that the model's blindness is at best unclear, that its protection of individuals is problematic, and that its
function is undetermined. In short, the model remains as incoherent
as this writer argued it was in 1983.23
This is not to say that the model could not be clarified by the framework offered by Professors Paetzold and Willborn, or even that it
might be judicially clarified in the manner that they and the Allen
authors suggest. To the extent, therefore, that the framework is advocacy of an "ought," this response's critique of the existing clarity of
the model is, in fact, unresponsive. Some critical thoughts on the matter of the desirability of the "ought" will nevertheless be offered. In
particular, it will be argued here that an anti-barrier rationale for the
model is not substantially distinct from the rationales that Professors
Paetzold and Willborn reject. Which of these rejected rationales is the
best account of the model remains dependent upon the, as yet, judicially unclarified meanings to be assigned to the elements of the
model, in particular the "business necessity" element largely ignored
by Paetzold and Willborn and by the Allen authors.
I.

A

SUMMARY OF THE "DECONSTRUCTION"

ARGUMENT WITH

(RELATIVELY MINOR) QUIBBLES

Professors Paetzold and Willborn believe that the concurrence and
stratification lenses supply "insights into the essential nature of the
disparate impact model. '24 What is their view of this "essential nature"? The following summarizes their argument, registering minor
quibbles along the way.
First, according to Deconstructing DisparateImpact, the key to un-

derstanding the model is causation, and the key to understanding causation is the "ordinary disparate impact case."'25 The paradigm for the
21. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).

22. Id. at 431.
23. Paul N. Cox, Substance and Process in Employment DiscriminationLaw: One View of the
Swamp, 18 VAL. U. L. REV. 21, 23 (1983) [hereinafter Cox, Substance and Process]. A number
of the positions I take in this article are critically addressed by Paetzold & Willborn, supra note
1, at 368-74, 368 n.142, 370 n.147, 372 n.156, 373-74 n.161, and by Allen et al., supra note 19, at
174 n.3, 176 n.16, 190 n.96, 196 n.140, and I would now be critical, albeit for different reasons, of
many others in the article. This response is both a defense of some and a clarification, given my
current thinking, of other of these positions.
24. Paetzold & Willborn, supra note 1, at 351.
25. Id.
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ordinary case is Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,26 where the Supreme
Court first announced its adoption of the model. At issue in Griggs
was an employer's use of a high-school-diploma requirement and an
intelligence-test requirement. 27 The adverse effect of the high-schooldiploma requirement was demonstrated by the fact that 34% of whites
and 12% of blacks in the population of the state in which the employer was located possessed such a diploma.2 8 The test's adverse impact was demonstrated by evidence of disparities in the scores of
white and black test takers in samples of such test takers unrelated to
the employer's experience with the test.2 9
Second, the Court in Griggs focused on the disparities generated by
these employer requirements without engaging in a stratification exercise. That is, the Court did not seek to discover the reason for the
impact in antecedent social causes. Stratification, for example, might
have revealed that high school graduation is explained by differences
in income correlated with race. From the Court's failure to engage in
this exercise, Professors Paetzold and Willborn conclude that causation is viewed "with blinders" in ordinary cases: antecedent causes
are ignored. 30 The implication, quite in keeping with the Court's pronouncement in Griggs that intentional discrimination is not required
under impact theory, is that "employers may be held legally responsible for impacts that are 'caused' in substantial part by factors external
'31
to employers.
I invoke a quibble at this point. There is a sense in which the Court,
in fact, did allude to "stratification" in Griggs: the Court's opinion
explains group differences in test performance as attributable to differences in the "social" allocation of educational resources, particularly in the form of intentional school segregation. 32 The failure of
Professors Paetzold and Willborn to note this point is potentially (but
as will be seen below, not fatally) 33 embarrassing to their later thesis
that the model is not limited to criteria that operate to perpetuate
intentional "societal discrimination. ' 34 However, the point also reinforces their argument that the impact model, at least in Griggs, was
"blindered." The Court, after all, did impose employer liability for
26. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).

27.
28.
29.
30.

Id. at 425-26.
Id. at 430 n.6.
Id.
Paetzold & Willborn, supra note 1, at 352-56.

31. Id. at 354.

32. 401 U.S. at 430.
33. See infra note 59 and accompanying text.
34. Paetzold & Willbom, supra note 1, at 376.
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disparate effect regardless of the antecedent social sources of that effect, even while simultaneously recognizing these antecedent social
causes.
Third, Griggs also suggests, according to these authors, that the impact model is "blindered" in a second way: it does not require a plaintiff to prove "actual disparate impact in the workplace"; hypothetical
impact will do. 35 By this the authors apparently mean 36 that the Court
in Griggs recognized liability for use of both the diploma and test requirements without inquiring into whether they had redundant effects,
that is, whether persons subject to the diploma requirement would
have been excluded, even in its absence, by the test requirement. 37
An implication the authors draw from the Court's failure to consider
the "net effect" of the two criteria (i.e., the failure to inquire into possible redundancy) is that the "joint effect" of multiple criteria may
nevertheless be attacked under the impact model. 38 This is an invocation of the concurrence lens: even if criteria considered separately
have no disparate effect, they may, considered jointly, have such an
effect. The legal conclusion asserted from these possibilities is that a
successful disparate impact model attack may be made either in the
case of a joint disparate effect or in the case of the disparate effect of a
separate criterion (even though, in the latter case, there is either no
effect when the single criterion is considered jointly or where there is
no net effect from joint consideration due to redundancy).
A quibble: the concurrence lens conclusion is something of a
stretch if predicated simply on Griggs. The Court did not consider
these complexities in that case, so it is difficult to see why these conclusions should be deemed implications of that failure. Some support
for these conclusions, however, may be found in the authors' next
point.
Fourth, the concurrence lens supports the Supreme Court's conclusion in Connecticut v. Teal that the impact model protects "individuals."' 39 The Court's conclusion appears peculiar because individuals
35. Id.

36. There is another sense in which actual disparate impact is not necessary: it is the impact
on the protected group viewed generally or as a whole, and not the impact on the protected

group within the employer's work force or applicant pool, that is of concern. See Cox, Substance
and Process,supra note 23, at 53-54; cf. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio, 490 U.S. 642, 651

(1989) (finding that a cannery work force was not a good proxy for a qualified population or
labor pool).
37. Paetzold & Willborn, supra note 1, at 357. This treatment apparently treats the high

school and test requirements in Griggs as joint employment requirements for the same position
for the purpose of illustration.

38. Id.
39. 457 U.S. 440, 453-54 (1982).
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have no right under the impact model to freedom from "unnecessary
barriers" absent proof of disparate effect on the group defined by
their protected status. 40 The authors nevertheless offer the following
account of "individual protection": the impact model, viewed through
the concurrence lens, is concerned with whether the protected group
as a whole is excluded by a criterion, even where it has no actual effect
on any actual employee or applicant (at least where actual employees
4
or applicants would have been excluded by a redundant criterion). '
In the Paetzold and Willborn example, 42 two employer-selection requirements, a test and a diploma requirement, are perfectly redundant: all applicants who pass the test possess a high school diploma
and all who fail the test lack the diploma. It is assumed that the test is
justified and that it excludes all of the applicants who lack a diploma.
It is also assumed that the diploma has an unjustified disparate impact. According to Paetzold and Willborn, black applicants who lack
the diploma may attack the requirement even though they would be
excluded by the test, and this means that the impact model focuses
upon the "individual effect" of the diploma, not its actual effect in the
particular workplace. 43 This apparently means that black applicants
excluded by the diploma requirement have standing to enjoin its use,
even though they also would be legitimately excluded by the test, because the diploma has a disparate effect on blacks as a group, even
though it has no actual effect on actual black applicants. However, an
individual minority employee or applicant may obtain compensatory,
as well as injunctive, relief if actually affected by a criterion that has a
disparate effect on the group as a whole, even though it has no actual
effect on other actual minority employees or applicants. 44 In the example, if one black applicant passed the test but lacked the diploma,
he could obtain a compensatory remedy.45
This view of "individual protection" serves to explain Teal's rejection of a "bottom line balance" defense. The Court concluded that a
subgroup of the protected group could challenge a component of a
selection process under the impact model, even though the group was
not excluded by the selection process itself.46 Teal, therefore, supports
the concurrence thesis, at least to the extent that the disparate effect
of distinct criteria may be attacked even where there is no "net" dis40. Id. at 457 (Powell, J., dissenting).
41. Paetzold & Willborn, supra note 1, at 357-62, 359 n.106.
42. Id. at 358.

43. Id. at 359.
44. Id. at 361-62.
45. Id. at 360-61.
46. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 451-52 (1982).
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parate effect from criteria considered in combination. Teal also lends
support, in a way in which Griggs' failure to address complexities does
not, for the further thesis that the joint disparate effect of combined
criteria may be attacked where criteria considered separately produce
no effect. This is because Teal implies that it is the long term effect of
criteria on the protected group as a whole, and not "bottom line balance" in a work force, that is of concern.
Fifth, the authors derive from the above a proposition about the
rationale or function of the impact model: the model is explained
neither by an equal achievement rationale nor by a variation on equal
treatment. 47 An equal achievement rationale for the impact model
views the model as designed to ensure a distributional objective:
equal (or proportional) distribution of employment between, e.g., race
and gender, groups. 48 The authors argue, however, that "other elements" of the impact model, in particular the requirement that the
plaintiff identify and attack particular criteria and the business necessity defense, "constrain" blindered causation and limit its effectiveness
as an instrument of equal achievement. 49 This argument apparently
concedes that "blindered causation," considered independently,
points to equal achievement. However, the authors, in a footnote, indicate that the concurrence lens, insofar as it implies rejection of inquiry at the "bottom line," also undermines an equal achievement
50
explanation.
An equal treatment rationale for the impact model views the model
as approximating a prohibition of disparate treatment, or discrimination motivated or caused by protected status. "Discriminatory intent"
is difficult to establish, but the combination of a disparate adverse effect on the protected group and the absence of a business justification
for this effect gives rise to a suspicion of disparate treatment or is a
state of affairs closely resembling disparate treatment. 51 The authors
reject this' explanation on the basis of "blindered causation." First,
and as a matter of stratification, evidence of an antecedent social
cause of disparate impact undermines any inference that the employer
caused this impact. 52 Yet blindered causation will generally preclude
this employer excuse. Second, and as a matter of concurrence,
"[e]vidence that a criterion has a disparate impact when considered
47. Paetzold & Willborn, supra note 1, at 364-74.
48. Cox, Substance and Process,supra note 23, at 47 (relying upon Owen M. Fiss, A Theory of
FairEmployment Laws, 38 U. Cm. L. REv. 235 (1970)).
49. Paetzold & Willborn, supra note 1, at 369.
50. Id. at 368 n.142.
51. Cox, Substance and Process,supra note 23, at 108-17.
52. Paetzold & Willborn, supra note 1, at 372-73.
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individually, but no disparate screening effect when an employer used
it in combination with other criteria, would tend to undermine" a
claim that the employer adopted the criterion for the purpose of discriminating.5 3 There is a third reason, mentioned by the authors but
not directly invoked by them in the context of their critique of the
equal treatment rationale, that nevertheless appears to influence their
conclusion. They argue that the business necessity defense "has very
little to do with discrimination directly"5 4 because any inference of
intent arising from the absence of a justification is "weak. ' 55 It is said
criteria may be adopted from "custom, ignorance,
to be weak because '56
or thoughtlessness.
Given their rejection of the equal achievement and equal treatment
rationales, Professors Paetzold and Willborn propose a third rationale:
the model prohibits unnecessary barriers that disproportionately exclude protected groups.57 This rationale is not limited to barriers that
perpetuate past societal discrimination because courts are not
equipped to identify such social causes. 58 (At least as good a reason,
however, is that the Supreme Court has expressly rejected such a limitation.) 59 According to DeconstructingDisparateImpact, the anti-barriers rationale, as seen through the stratification and concurrence
lenses, is supported by "efficiency" in that the rationale avoids difficult issues of determining intent and of disentangling the net effects of
multiple criteria, and by the proposition that the rationale produces an
acceptable level of "precision" in identifying inappropriate criteria
linked to protected status at relatively low cost. 60 This low-cost notion
is in part a reference to avoiding the litigation costs entailed if antecedent social causes (stratification) were excuses or if net effects of criteria were in issue and in part a reference to the "low social value" of
criteria not justified by business necessity.
A number of quibbles may be registered regarding these matters of
efficiency and precision. First, whether criteria not justified by business necessity are of low social value depends, as the authors recognize, upon whether the courts are competent assessors of this value
and upon whether the standard of justification adopted is one that
53. Id. at 372-73.

54. Id. at 369.
55. Id. at 369 n.145.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 374.

58. Id. at 374-75.
59. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust Co., 487 U.S. 977, 988 (1988).
60. Paetzold & Willborn, supra note 1, at 374-77.
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identifies "low social value. ' 61 If business necessity requires indispensability, 62 criteria abandoned under such a standard are not plausibly characterized as ones of "low social value."
Second, it is not clear whether the concurrence and stratification
lenses save or exacerbate litigation costs. Under the authors' proposals, concurrence avoids the "cost" of identifying net effects of redundant criteria but multiplies the bases upon which plaintiffs may attack
criteria and, therefore, the efforts employers must undertake to anticipate such attacks. Under their stratification proposals, plaintiffs may
employ stratification to attack express criteria having no aggregate adverse effect if accounting for antecedent variables not expressly required by an employer nevertheless demonstrates an effect. 63 The
authors would also permit defensive use of such an antecedent, but
not an expressly required, variable (such as education) where "closely
related to legitimate employer interests" and justified by business necessity. 64 These proposals potentially multiply both the complexity
and cost of litigation by rendering the possibilities they identify worthy of exploration, even if a general rule against stratification would
tend to remove the issue from the litigation table.
Third, while it may be the case that an anti-barriers conception
would clarify the meaning of disparate effect and, thus, generate some
efficiencies by rendering the law more predictable, it is problematic to
assume that this would enhance "efficiency" when that term is broadly
construed. If, for example, the authors' version of the impact model
enhances the prospects for successful lawsuits which deter the use of
criteria with "high social value" (given "imprecision" in judicial assessment of business necessity), it may be better from a social efficiency point of view to reject that version in favor of one that would
discourage lawsuits (as by recognizing a general "stratification" defense). However, it may be that by "efficiency" and "precision" the
authors mean only "judicial workability." If this is the case, it may be
conceded that the concurrence and stratification lenses serve to
render the impact model workable. They do so, however, through a
kind of formalism: a conscious effort not to engage in an inquiry into
the complexities of social causation through stratification or to confront the difficult questions of cognizable harm that could arise absent
61. Id. at 376 n.169.
62. See, e.g., Bradley v. Pizzaco of Neb., Inc., 7 F.3d 795, 798 (8th Cir. 1993); E.E.O.C. v. Rath
Packing Co., 787 F.2d 318, 332 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 910 (1986); Firefighters Inst. for
Racial Equal. v. City of St. Louis, 549 F.2d 506, 511-14 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 819

(1977).
63. Paetzold & Willbom, supra note 1,at 396-97.

64. Id. at 393-94.
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blindered "concurrence." Such workability may be a virtue, but it is
no guarantee of "precision" in the identification of "inappropriate"
criteria of "low social value."
Again, however, these are quibbles. They are not the points of interest in this response. The response, rather, is to the view taken in
Deconstructing Disparate Impact regarding the function or rationale
for the impact model. It is to this that I now turn.
II.

ON PROTECTING INDIVIDUALS

As previously noted, Professors Paetzold and Willborn contend that
the impact model protects individuals. 65 In this conclusion, they have
the support of the Supreme Court's majority opinion in Connecticut v.
Teal.66 More importantly, they offer an explanation of the Court's
contention: a protected individual adversely affected by an employment criterion that disproportionately excludes a protected group
viewed as a whole, e.g., the otherwise-qualified African-American
population generally, may obtain a compensatory remedy for this effect even though members of the protected group in the employer's
work force actually subjected to the criterion were not adversely affected or even though the protected group is proportionately repre67
sented in the work force.
A.

The Meaning of Individual Protection

Why is the "individual protection" point of importance? One possibility is that it answers a technical question about standing to sue and
the availability of a compensatory remedy. Another, however, is that
a more general point about the nature of the right or entitlement is
being made: that the impact model protects individuals, not groups.
68
Deconstructing Disparate Impact clearly makes the former point.
Does it make the latter? Professors Paetzold and Willborn appear to
make the latter point for three reasons: they speak in terms of "the
individual nature of Title VII's protections"; 69 they reject an equal
(group) achievement rationale for the model; 70 and they appear to endorse the theory of the Allen authors that Title VII protects individu71
als on a probabilistic basis.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

See supra notes 40-46 and accompanying text.
457 U.S. 440 (1982).
Paetzold & Willborn, supra note 1, at 357-62.
See supra notes 39-46 and accompanying text.
Paetzold & Willborn, supra note 1, at 361 n.112.
Id. at 371.
Id. at 374 n.163.
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If DeconstructingDisparateImpact makes the second point, what is
its importance? At least conventionally, it is the disparate treatment
or intentional discrimination model of prohibited conduct, not the disparate impact model, that is associated with protection of individuals;
yet, Professors Paetzold and Willborn reject attempts to understand
the impact model in terms of the treatment model.72 If by "protecting
individuals" one means that the impact model protects an individual
entitlement, one is at least alluding to and invoking the support of
individualist political commitments or seeking to establish connections
to legal traditions understood in terms of these commitments. To argue, instead, that the impact model recognizes and enforces a group
entitlement is, from an individualist political perspective, to begin an
indictment of the model and from an anti-individualist, call it communal, perspective, to begin a defense of it. From a more objective or
explanatory perspective, the individual entitlement and group entitlement characterizations are invoked to say something about important
distinctions between legal traditions reflecting individualist commitments and legal traditions not doing so.
Consider, for example, this argument: the common law, at least as
classically conceived, is individualistic, transactional, and derivative
from social practice. 73 Among the implications of this characterization is that legal procedure, substantive law, and remedy are intertwined such that, for example, standing to enforce an entitlement is a
function of identifying the individual recognized as having it, and remedy is limited by the extent of harm to the status quo represented by
the entitlement. 74 Post-New Deal law or the law of the "Administrative State," by contrast, is collectivist, prospective, and directive of social practice. 75 Among the implications are that procedure,
substantive law, and remedy are not interdependent or mutually defined. 76 So, standing, for example, is merely a tool by means of which

a collective objective may be attained and should be assessed by reference to its efficacy in this respect. A second example: the scope and
content of remedy need have no necessary relation to individual entitlement, as its function is that of effecting directed reform.77 There
72. Id. at 368-69.

73. See, e.g., Donald H. Gjerdingen, The Politics of the Coase Theorem and Its Relationship to
Modern Legal Thought, 35 BuFF.L. REV. 871, 876-83 (1986); Jerry L. Mashaw, "Rights" in the
FederalAdministrative State, 92 YALE L.J. 1129, 1153-59 (1983).
74. Gjerdingen, supra note 73, at 876-78. For a defense of this classical scheme in terms of
corrective justice, see ERNEST J.WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 22-55 (1995).
75. Gjerdingen, supra note 73, at 876-83; Mashaw, supra note 73, at 1152-58.
76. Gjerdingen, supra note 73, at 883.
77. Id. at 883; Mashaw, supra note 73, at 1155.

DEPAUL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:265

have been a number of impressive efforts to examine and explain
these differences, but a useful one for present purposes may be that of
distinguishing between a corrective justice concerned with "wrong
moves" in human relations conceived of as transactions, on the one
hand, and a directive justice concerned with effecting desired distributive patterns in human relations conceived in terms of status, on the
other.78
The impact model has at least on occasion been employed as an
example within this directive category, 79 and there are persuasive reasons for thinking it a good example. While it is surely the case that
"individuals" may obtain compensatory remedies when adversely affected by a neutral employment criterion, they must first establish
group harm in the form of disproportionate exclusion of the protected
group and their status as members of that group. It may be the case
that, as Professors Paetzold and Willborn contend, an employee enjoying protected status excluded by a criterion may obtain a compensatory remedy even though no other actual employees enjoying that
status were adversely affected by the criterion, 80 but the remedy remains contingent upon proof that the protected group as a whole
would be excluded by the criterion. The implication clearly would
seem to be that such a neutral criterion is suspect by virtue of its projected distributive consequences and that compensatory remedies are
devices by means of which persons are induced to bring such suspect
criteria to the attention of the "administrative state." A similar point
may be made concerning standing. Under the argument of Deconstructing DisparateImpact, persons enjoying protected status and actually subjected to a neutral criterion may attack it for purposes of an
injunction, even where not harmed in fact by its disparate effect on
the protected group as a whole. 81 They might therefore be said to be
individuals protected by the impact model in the purely descriptive
sense that they may invoke the model, but the instrumental use of
their standing for the purpose of effecting a desired distribution of
employment to the group defined by their status is the plausible explanation of this descriptive "fact."
Is there nevertheless a basis for conceiving of the impact model as
"protecting individuals" in some deeper sense than a description of
78. Gjerdingen, supra note 73, at 876-78.
79. Paul N. Cox, The Supreme Court, Title VII, and "Voluntary" Affirmative Action-A Critique, 21 IND. L. REv. 767, 785-816 (1988) [hereinafter Cox, Affirmative Action]; cf. Mashaw,

supra note 73, at 1154, 1165-66 (using discrimination cases as examples within a directive
conception).
80. Paetzold & Willborn, supra note 1, at 360-62.
81. Id. at 358-59.
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remedy and standing? The most sophisticated effort to find such a
basis is that of the Allen authors, 82 and Paetzold and Willborn appear
to endorse that effort.8 3 The Allen authors contend that the Supreme
Court's interpretations of Title VII, at least prior to the Wards Cove
decision, are best explained by a single rationale: "elimination of barriers to employment that are a function of certain personal characteristics." 84 Thus, "Title VII is violated if a person's employment
prospects are marginally diminished for reasons associated with those
characteristics and if there is no adequate business justification for the
barrier. '85 Moreover, disparate treatment, or "intentional discrimination," is not, according to the Allen authors' view, the central or paradigmatic evil attacked by Title VII; rather, it is merely a clear example
86
within the noted rationale.
The disparate treatment model of employment discrimination is
conventionally viewed as protecting individuals by removing status
(e.g., race) as a legitimate ground for decision: employers must be
"status blind" and must therefore allocate employment opportunities
on the basis of individual characteristics (e.g., "merit"). 87 The Allen
authors' position regarding Title VII's protection of individuals is
somewhat distinct. As I understand that position, individuals are protected by Title VII in the sense that their probability of obtaining an
employment opportunity is rendered unaffected by status (their "prospects" are rendered not "marginally diminished"). 88 Call this an
"equalizing probabilities" explanation of Title VII. Disparate treatment entails a clear-cut reduction in the probability of obtaining an
opportunity: persons of a disfavored status are excluded from employment. 89 Disparate impact, however, also entails this reduction: a
status-neutral criterion generating a disparate impact is one correlated
82. See generally Allen et al., supra note 19.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Paetzold & Willborn, supra note 1, at 374 n.163.
Allen et al., supra note 19, at 177.
Id.
Id.
Cox, Affirmative Action, supra note 79, at 772-85.

88. At least this is my reading of the Allen theory. The Allen authors suggest that Title VII
targets barriers that are a function of status. Allen et al., supra note 19, at 177. I take this to
mean a mathematical function: a relationship between the values of two variables. They also
say that "Title VII is violated if a person's employment prospects are marginally diminished for
reasons associated with" status. Id. at 177. I take this to mean that the probability of obtaining
some employment opportunity is reduced by a barrier that is a function of status-i.e., that
success under the barrier (the value of the success variable) is related to status (the value of the
status variable). This relationship may be interpreted as establishing probability ("prospects
for") if the relationship is employed as a predictor, e.g., status predicts success. Notice that the
prediction is predicated in the Allen authors' theory solely on status. Id.
89. Id. at 192.

DEPAUL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:265

with protected status in that individuals of the status disproportionately excluded by the criterion have a lower probability of obtaining
an opportunity than those of a status disproportionately included by
the criterion. 90
There is, of course, a sense in which "equalizing probabilities associated with protected status" protects individuals. By defining the entitlement in question in probabilistic terms, the rationale enables a view
of the individual in these terms. The right implied by the rationale is
an "individual right" because the individual is conceived in terms of
her probability of success. This probability is itself established by reference to group success: the individual's probability of success is
given by calculating the success rate of the group of which she is a
member. Still, this conception of the individual is not alien to common practices. One relevant analogue is an actuarial calculation
founded on group averages. 91 The value of an individual entitlement
to a lifetime annuity is, for example, a function of the "individual's"
projected lifespan, a matter determined by group average.
Nevertheless, there is something peculiar about this "individual protection" characterization of the equalizing probabilities rationale, and
this peculiarity may help to unlock important distinctions between the
disparate impact and disparate treatment models. Consider a race
neutral criterion, such as a graduate-degree requirement, that disproportionately excludes a racial group. Mr. Jones, a member of that
group, happens to possess such a graduate degree. Insofar as Mr.
Jones is concerned, the "equalizing probabilities" rationale is apparently "blind" to his possession of the requisite credential: the
probability of his obtaining the opportunity for which the degree is
required is determined by reference to his racial status, not by reference to other variables. If Mr. Jones has an "individual right" to
equalized probabilities, but probability is a function solely of status,
the analysis would seem to require that Mr. Jones' individuating characteristics, apart from his status, be ignored.
Perhaps this interpretation, however, is wrong in at least one sense:
perhaps Mr. Jones lacks standing to attack the graduate-degree requirement if he possesses the degree. 92 Does such a standing require90. Id. at 180-81.
91. Id. at 184-85.
92. See, e.g., Melendez v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 79 F.3d 661, 667-68 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding
that the plaintiff must show that he was personally injured by the defendant-employer's alleged
discriminatory employment practice in order to have constitutional standing); Robinson v. Polaroid Corp., 732 F.2d 1010, 1016 (1st Cir. 1984) (holding that laid-off employees had to a show a
causal connection between the application of the employer's "ten year" seniority rule and the
alleged discriminatory impact on the protected class in order to have standing).
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ment render the equalized probabilities rationale one of "individual
protection"? The argument that it does seems straightforward: persons lacking the graduate degree have an "individual right" to be free
from the impediment it presents to the probability of their success.
The argument, however, is not quite correct, for it is only persons of a
particular status who also lack the degree that have a claim. Status
provides the basis for the probability calculation. The hypothesized
standing requirement serves to identify the subgroup within the minority group whose probability of success is actually impeded, and
may serve to establish a necessary stake in the litigation for Article III
purposes,93 but it remains a particular status, and not other indicia of
probability, that is the basis for the probability calculation. The individuating characteristics of persons who lack the graduate degree are
as ignored in the probability calculation as the individuating characteristics of those who possess the degree.
Why might the "blindness" of the equalizing probabilities rationale
to individuating characteristics be important to an "individual" versus
"group" characterization of the rights implied by the disparate treatment and disparate impact models? One possibility, consistent with a
species of "individualist" rhetoric, is that "individual merit, ' not "status," should be the basis for allocation of employment opportunities.
This possibility has the virtue of invoking the historical hostility of
"individualist" commitments to status allocation, and the further individualist virtue of assuming individual entitlement to individuating
characteristics, but it is inadequate at the level of generality at which it
is stated. It is inadequate because the statement may be read as advocating an authoritative, state-enforced notion of desert, and the impact model, given its focus on the "business necessity and job related"
justification for employment criteria generating an adverse impact,
may be read as consistent with such a state-enforced notion of desert.94 The difficulty is that individualists tend to be hostile to such a
notion. 95
Consider, however, another reading of the "individual merit not status" precept in combination with the point made above that the Allen
authors' "equalizing probabilities" rationale ignores individuating
characteristics. The alternative reading is that of authoritatively pre93. Coe v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 646 F.2d 444, 451-53 (10th Cir. 1981).
94. Mark Kelman, Concepts of Discriminationin "General Ability" Job Testing, 104 HARV. L.
REV. 1158, 1183-98 (1991).
95. FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 85-102 (1960). There are, of

course, ambiguities in the notion of "individualism." For Hayek's account of these, see FRIED.
RICH A. HAYEK, Individualism: True and False, in INDIVIDUALISM AND ECONOMIC ORDER 1-32

(Gateway ed. 1972) (1948).
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cluding employer reliance upon status and leaving the matter of
"merit" to "private" regulation: status is inalienable, but the meritorious or non-meritorious character of individual characteristics apart
from status is a matter of what price they might bring in a market.
This alternative is approximately that suggested by the disparate treatment model. Notice two points about this alternative. First, it contemplates a right to "freedom from" consideration of one's status that
simultaneously limits the freedom of action both of its possessor and
of others. This is not peculiar. It is in the nature of rights, including
individual ones, that they constrain others (rights are in fact the obligations of others) 96 and protecting a right through an inalienability
rule always constrains its possessor. 97 Second, the alternative reading
creates a narrow "right" and, therefore, a narrow obligation. The
reading generates an Hohfeldian privilege regarding aspects of the individual apart from status (even though this privilege is parasitic on
assumed alienable entitlements to these aspects, such as Mr. Jones'
98
graduate degree).
The importance of these points lies in contrasting them to the implications of the disparate impact model, particularly as viewed from an
"equalizing probabilities" perspective. First, the individual right to
equal prospects contemplated by this perspective again constrains the
freedom of action of the possessor of the right and of others by rendering inalienable a characteristic that, absent the prohibition of the
model, could be alienated. If the hypothetical employer's graduatedegree requirement is invalidated, the employer may not formally
purchase and Mr. Jones may not formally sell the human capital represented by the degree. Second, the right and, therefore, the obligation created is no longer narrow. The scope of the Hohfeldian
privilege has been dramatically reduced. 99

96. Wesley N. Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 30-32 (1913).
97. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral,85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1111-15 (1972).

98. In Hohfeld's scheme, "a privilege is the opposite of a duty and the correlative of a 'no
right."' Hohfeld, supra note 96, at 32. The notion is invoked here, not from a devotion to the
complexities and difficulties of the Hohfeldian scheme, but to suggest that what is sometimes
called a "general right to liberty" entails the absence of a "right" in another to compel an act or
to compel refraining from one. Id.

99. Cf. Michel Rosenfeld, Substantive Equality and Equal Opportunity: A JurisprudentialAppraisal,74 CAL. L. REv. 1687, 1693-94 (1986) (noting the distinction between negative and positive liberty as one of extent of the governmental role in the allocation of goods).
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IndividualistRights and EgalitarianRights

Is the distinction therefore merely one of degree, whether this degree is viewed as degree of freedom of contract or degree of governmental decision? Perhaps it is, but the matter of degree masks a
difference in kind. Individualist political philosophies are notable for
their commitment to short lists of rights, precisely because rights are
legal obligations and the individualist commitment is hostile to legal
obligation. 100 Individualist rhetoric, therefore, invokes images of
"freedom from interference" or "negative freedom."' 01 This stance
clearly implies that the right generated by even the disparate treatment prohibition is problematic,10 2 but, given the prohibition, it further implies that this right should be narrowed to a minimum, a
process clearly evident in the Supreme Court's recent precedent regarding the disparate treatment theory. 0 3 Moreover, the stance im-

plies that the right should be assimilated to a common law baseline
and should, therefore, take on the integrated attributes of that base100. ANTHONY DE JASAY, CHOICE, CONTRACT,CONSENT. A RESTATEMENT OF LIBERALISM
33-51 (1991); see LOREN E. LOMASKY, PERSONS, RIGHTS AND ThE MORAL COMMUNITY 3-15

(1987) (lamenting the abuse of rights and favoring basic rights); JAN NARVESON, THE LIBERTARIAN IDEA 41-61 (1988) (favoring the version of negative rights).
101. Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118-72 (1969). Ber-

lin contrasts negative liberty with positive liberty, and positive liberty is often equated, as in
Rosenfeld, supra note 99, at 1693-94, with the egalitarian notion of a distribution of goods sufficient to enable pursuit of objectives. Berlin's usage is distinct but perhaps related: positive
liberty is a state of Kantian freedom, particularly understood in terms of undistorted choice or

absence of "false consciousness." See BERLIN, supra, at 132-34.
102. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS, THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT Dis-

CRIMINATION LAWS 147-266 (1992) (criticizing employment discrimination law generally, includ-

ing the disparate treatment prohibition on what may be thought to be individualist grounds). It
should be noted, however, that Professor Epstein's critique is premised upon a utilitarian and
consequentialist argument. See id. The associational freedom he advocates is, therefore,

grounded in a kind of collectivism, and one consistent at some levels of abstraction with legal
realist and post-New Deal Law's conception of law as a purposive instrument for achieving a
desired end-state. Id. This, however, may be explained by the necessity of a distributive background for a corrective conception of law, RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRU-

DENCE 323-24 (1990), or as use of an efficiency criterion as a proxy for libertarian commitments,
ANTHONY KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER 234-35 (1993). Professor Epstein's recommendations

are compatible with a corrective form of justice, so his utilitarian collectivism might be a proxy
for such a conception.
103. See, e.g., St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 2745 (1993) (holding that
proof of pretext does not mandate a judgment for the plaintiff); Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 113
S.Ct. 1701, 1703 (1993) (finding motivation independent of protected status not illicit even if
improper); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 262-63 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(arguing that disparate treatment requires "but for" causation); id. at 285 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (noting that the burden of persuasion remains at all times on the plaintiff and qualifications
of a person hired need not be superior to those of the plaintiff); Texas Dept. of Community
Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253, 258-59 (1981) (same).
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line. 10 4 One would therefore expect, and the expectation is confirmed
by precedent, that disparate treatment will be conceived as a "wrong
move" within a status quo assumed not to entail such a move; 105 that
remedies will be narrowly compensatory; 106 that standing will be confined to a limited class of tangible victims of the "wrong move"; 107 and
that the background norms within which the prohibition is understood
will be those compatible with the individualist stance.10 8
Contrast these points to "statist" political commitments, 0 9 particularly of egalitarian liberal varieties. Egalitarian liberalism tends, particularly when predicated upon Kantian autonomy, 10 simultaneously
to deny that persons deserve or are entitled to their individuating
characteristics and to insist upon distributional equality, typically
equality framed in terms of a welfare criterion.11 ' The consequence,
when combined with a strong postulate of governmental competence
to bring about desired social end-states, is a simultaneous constriction
of "rights," in one sense of the term, and expansion of these "rights,"
in another.
Rights, in the first sense, afford absolute protection of individual
choice of and commitment to ends, but are highly limited in that the
private, individual realm they contemplate is one of Kantian deliberation, or intellectual liberty, disconnected from the human ends contemplated in this deliberation and from means to the satisfaction of
104. See Gjerdingen, supra note 73, at 878 (noting the integrated nature of the common law
scheme and the assumption of the legitimacy of the status quo).
105. Biggins, 113 S. Ct. at 1707 (holding that age must be a determinative factor); Burdine,450
U.S. at 253 (placing the burden of persuasion on the plaintiff).
106. Cf. Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 278 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (arguing that there is no liability
if the same action would have been taken without considering status).
107. Cf. id. (arguably treating the victim of sexist statements not as a victim absent tangible
job loss, but query whether this would be the case if the plaintiff attacked the statements). For a
discussion of causation consistent with a "wrong move" view, see Paul N. Cox, A Defense of
"Necessary Cause" in Individual Disparate Treatment Theory Under Title VII, 11 ST. Louis U.
PuB. L. REV. 29, 39-68 (1992) [hereinafter Cox, Necessary Cause].
108. Cf. McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ'g Co., 115 S. Ct. 879, 886-87 (1995) (holding that

after-acquired evidence of misconduct cuts-off "compensatory remedies," arguably implying an
"at will" background assumption). For a discussion of this background assumption, see Cox,
Necessary Cause, supra note 107, at 51.

109. See Mashaw, supra note 73, at 1152-58 (employing a "statist" characterization).
110. "Kantian autonomy" means a state of freedom characterized by a detached and deliberative choice of ends, a notion associated with "positive liberty" and "intellectual freedom." This
conception of freedom is typically associated with Rawls. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JusTICE (1971). But see CHARLES E. LARMORE, PATrERNS OF MORAL COMPLEXITY 77-85, 118-30

(1987) (criticizing Kant and Rawls from, perhaps, a classically liberal perspective); MICHAEL J.
SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMrrs OF JUSTICE (1982) (criticizing Rawls from a communitarian perspective).
111. RAWLS, supra note 110, at 72, 310-15.
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these ends. 112 Rights, in the second sense, are malleable, instrumental
means of effecting state-determined distributive end-states. 113
The absolute autonomy rights of the first sort resemble the rights of
the individualist scheme; the malleable rights of the second sort do
not. Consider a right in the Hohfeldian sense, a sense requiring a correlative duty.11 4 As rights entail duties, the broader a right and the
more numerous are rights, the greater the scope and number of duties.
Rights are therefore in substantial tension with "liberty" or
Hohfeldian "privilege," understood as a realm of action free from
(legal) obligation and, therefore, free from a requirement of justification of such action before public authority. This realm (whether it
extends to "commercial" or is limited to "intellectual" freedom) requires a basic set of rights or entitlements, but depends as well upon a
short list, and a predictable one, of relatively narrowly limited entitlements (that is, of the legal obligation of others). 115 Individualist property rights and egalitarian autonomy rights tend to display these
features, the former in service of commercial or market "freedom,"
the latter in service of limiting rights as constraints on redistributive
moves by the state. 116
However, egalitarian "instrumental" rights do not display these features. The premise underlying egalitarian instrumental rights is that
social arrangements (and human interactions within these) are contingent upon state permission. This is evident in post-New Deal conceptions of law as the purposive instrument of the state; 1 7 in legal realist
critiques of individualist "freedom" as dependent upon contingent
state allocations;11 8 in social choice theory's assumption that arrangements are contingent on collective choice; 119 and in accounts of the
"Administrative State" generally.1 20 As previously noticed, egalita112. RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 181-204, 316-31 (1985); RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RiGrrs SERIOUSLY, xi, 91-92, 264-65 (1978).
113. Cf. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 112, at 90-96 (distinguishing rights
from goals, arguments from principle, and arguments from policy). Note that the distinction in

the text is not an attempt to invoke Dworkin's theory of adjudication; it is a distinction, rather,
about the nature of legal claims and their justifications.
114. Hohfeld, supra note 96, at 28-59.
115. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
116. See DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE, supra note 112, at 316-31 (discussing a limited
version of anti-discrimination principle enabling state-fostered affirmative action).
117. See, e.g., Gjerdingen, supra note 73, at 878-83; Mashaw, supra note 73, at 1131.
118. Robert Hale, Coercion and Distributionin a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. SCI.
Q. 470, 471 (1923).
119. ROBERT GRAFSTEN, INSTITUTIONAL REALISM 179-84 (1992).
120. CAss R. SUNSTEN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVrNG TH-E REGULATORY STATE 32-46 (1990); Cass R. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 873, 884-90
(1987).
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rian autonomy rights effectively serve this premise by limiting their
scope and number as constraints on the state. Individualist rights, by
contrast, assume as a premise that social arrangements and human interactions are not contingent upon the permission of the state. 21 A
slogan suggesting this distinction exaggerates but plausibly depicts it:
in the individualist scheme, everything is permitted that is not forbidden and in the egalitarian, instrumental one, nothing is permitted that
is not affirmatively permitted. 122
If this is the case, egalitarian, instrumental rights should and do display features distinct from individualist rights: the duties they create
tend to be expansive; they are often vague (thus increasing prospects
for requiring public justification of "private" action); and there are
long lists of such rights. The evidence for these propositions would
seem clear, whatever one's commitments in contemporary debates
concerning "regulation" and "deregulation."
Given the propositions, what is "individual" about individualist
rights and egalitarian autonomy rights, and what is collective or
"group like" about egalitarian, instrumental rights? The individual
character of the former and group character of the latter are implied
by the distinct premises of the individualist and egalitarian positions
noted above. Individualist rights and egalitarian autonomy rights
have in common a notion, albeit of substantially distinct contents and
scopes, of a protected "private" sphere not contingent on state approval; this sphere is clearly identified with the individual. This is so,
whether for reasons of conceptions of the human dignity of the individual or for reasons of equating rational actor status to the individual
and deeming the sphere instrumentally necessary given this premise.
Egalitarian instrumental rights, by contrast, are "group like" precisely
because they serve as means to the achievement of the distributive
121. One variation on this theme is thai legal rights are natural or pre-political; another is that
they are derivative from social practice; a third is that they reflect a contractarian or conventionalist modus vivendi. See, e.g., FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION AND LIBERTY (1976)

(presenting a conventionalist theory); BRUNO LEONI, FREEDOM AND THE LAW (3d ed. 1991)
(presenting a derivative theory); ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY,

STATE AND UTOPIA (1974)

(presenting a Lockean theory). The premise, with the possible exception of some natural rights
theories, does not require a denial of historical contingency and may be combined with utilitarian (particularly indirect, evolutionary utilitarian) elements. Cf.ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW, How NEIGHBORS SEITrLE DISPUTES (1991) (presenting a conventionalist

account of norms with wealth maximization criterion as an explanation of content). However,
purely utilitarian accounts, suggested by economic analysis of law, may on some readings be
inconsistent with the premise, even if they produce conclusions resembling those predicated on
the premise. See, e.g., GEORGE P. FLETCHER, BASIC CONCEPTS OF LEGAL THOUGHT 164-70

(1976) (objecting to "Coasian analysis" on grounds of its alleged organic premises).
122. DE JASAY, supra note 100, at 47-51; GRAFSTEIN, supra note 119, at 179-84.
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pattern purposively sought by a state conceived as the continuous author of social arrangements and human interactions. A group focus
would seem to be inherent in this conception of the state and its objectives because such a focus is necessary to the notion of a distributive
pattern. Notice that it is not purposive instrumentalism per se that
constitutes the distinction. Neoclassical economic and utilitarian support for individualist rights clearly present instrumentalist, and collective, justifications for individualist rights. 123 Rather, it is the premise
of ongoing, continuous state assessment of the distributive pattern,
and the use of legal duty in service of this assessment, that generates
the distinction. Such duties are simply about ensuring adherence to
state-directed patterns.
Egalitarian instrumentalist rights, therefore, tend to be enforced
under relatively unpredictable standards rather than relatively predictable rules, ensuring that "private" decision is continuously contingent upon "public" approval. Enforcement is triggered by departures
from desired distributive patterns defined in terms of status, not by
"wrong moves" or narrowly defined actions. The obligations imposed
may be formally related to a particular event or action, but this is because that event or action is correlated with a departure from desired
patterns and deemed an effective pressure point for correcting this
departure. These factors add up to a group conception of a right: the
right is a group right in that it establishes in terms of status the distributive pattern desired by the state, and power conferred on individuals
124
to assert the right is a means by which this pattern is to be achieved.
The equalizing probabilities rationale for Title VII would seem consistent with this depiction of a group right. True, the rationale is
stated in terms of individual probability of obtaining an opportunity,
but this probability is itself established by reference solely to status.
Moreover, this matter of probability would seem itself intimately related to egalitarian distribution: to equalize probabilities in terms of
123. See EpSTEIN, supra note 102, at 15-27 (emphasizing functional justifications for private

property and freedom of contract); see id. at 59-78 (presenting efficiency arguments). Note,
however, that organic premises of economic analysis are in some tension with political commitments underlying individualist rights. See supra note 102. The reconciliation may depend upon
judgment, e.g., about the presence and magnitude of transaction costs and therefore of "market
failure," a proposition that obviously implies indeterminacy for the analysis. Cf. James E. Krier
& Stuard J. Schuab, Property Rules and Liability Rules: The Cathedral in Another Light, 70

N.Y.U. L. Rev. 440, 452 (1995) (noting that the tension in the economic analysis of law between
the assumption of transaction costs and the inability to specify damages renders the choice between the property rule and the liability rule problematic).
124. See Gjerdingen, supra note 73, at 880-83 (discussing an "end state" concept of rights);
Mashaw, supra note 73, at 1138-50 (noting a "shift away from individualist and toward statist
conceptions of rights").
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status is to ensure that persons have equal means of achievement, a
strategy quite distinct from ensuring that they are equally free from
some particularized obstacle to achievement. 125 It is, of course, plausible to characterize this distinction as reflecting distinct conceptions
of individualism, one associated with "positive liberty," the other with
"negative liberty"; however, the distinction, whether framed in these
terms, or in group/individual terms, remains an important
126
distinction.
C. The Allen Authors' Theory as Positive Theory
Of course, the importance of the distinction just discussed may not
be reflected in the law of Title VII. The Allen authors apparently
think it is not, for it is their contention that the Supreme Court's Title
VII precedent consistently reflects what I have termed the equalizing
probabilities rationale. Like Professors Paetzold and Willborn, the
Allen authors contend that the impact model targets "barriers" to employment opportunity that "marginally diminish" prospects of employment when this diminishment is associated with protected status
and when "there is no adequate business justification for this barrier."1 27 The Allen authors further contend that the disparate treatment prohibition is a subset of the impact model: excluding persons
for reasons of their status diminishes their prospects, and status is not
an adequate business justification.12 8 These claims require that much
Supreme Court rhetoric be ignored, but this is unobjectionable; the
Allen authors present a "positive theory," one that predicts outcomes
without reference to rhetoric.
There is much to be said for the Allen authors' equalizing probabilities theory. It often appears consistent with the cases, particularly
when it is considered with their further claim that Supreme Court
opinions in the Title VII context should be understood as concerned
with the matter of sufficiency of the evidence, rather than with the
substantive features of Title VII's prohibitions. 12 9 Nevertheless, the
contention here is that Title VII precedent reflects an unresolved tension between "individualist" and "group" commitments, that the precedent is therefore not consistent with a single, equalizing
probabilities theory, and that resolution of the tension may, counter to
125. Rosenfeld, supra note 99, at 1689-98; cf.Peter Westen, The Concept of Equal Opportu-

nity, 95 E-nucs 837, 844 (1985) (presenting equality as freedom from particular obstacle theory).
126.
127.
128.
129.

Rosenfeld, supra note 99, at 1689-98.
Allen et al., supra note 19, at 177.
Id.
Id.
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the position of both the Allen authors and Professors Paetzold and
Willborn, ultimately favor the individualist pole represented by the
disparate treatment prohibition. The contentions obviously require a
rebuttal of the capacity of the equalizing probabilities rationale as a
positive predictor. The rebuttal focuses upon the Allen authors' treatment of General Electric Co. v. Gilbert,130 City of Los Angeles Department of Water and Power v. Manhart131 and UAW v. Johnson Controls,
Inc. 132
At issue in Gilbert was an employer's exclusion of pregnancy from
its insurance against nonoccupational disability. 33 The Supreme
Court rejected a Title VII attack on this conclusion, after declining to
equate gender with pregnancy (or the risk of pregnancy), on the basis
that the evidence failed to disclose a difference between the "aggre34
gate risk protection" afforded men and women by the insurance.
The Allen authors quite plausibly conclude that the Court was therefore concerned with discriminatory effects, not "discriminatory animus": there is no Title VII liability "in cases which exhibit animus but
no discriminatory effect.' 135 On this quite plausible reading of the
case, disparate treatment is not itself Title VII's target; disparate effects (unequal probabilities) are the target. Disparate treatment is
merely evidence of the effect (evidence inconsistent with the actual
136
effect of the insurance scheme at issue in Gilbert).
Manhart has been viewed as inconsistent with Gilbert,1 37 but this is

not the Allen authors' reading. In Manhart,female employees were
required to make larger contributions to a pension plan than similarly
situated male employees to ensure equal monthly retirement benefits. 138 The difference in contribution was required by virtue of the
projected greater longevity of women-an actuarial calculation
founded solely on gender status and one that, if accurately made, rendered the actuarial value of pensions "equal" as between men and
women. 139 One would therefore expect, in keeping with the Allen authors' reading of Gilbert, that "animus," understood as status motive, 140 would not generate liability because "effects" were equal. The
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

429 U.S. 125 (1976).
435 U.S. 702 (1978).
499 U.S. 187 (1991).
429 U.S. at 127-28.
Id. at 138-40.
Allen et al., supra note 19, at 183.

136. Id. at 177-78.
137. See Manhart,435 U.S. at 723-25 (Blackmum, J.,
concurring).

138. Id. at 705.
139. Id.

140. For a discussion of the meaning of motive, see infra notes 154-56 and accompanying text.

DEPAUL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:265

Court nevertheless imposed liability, expressly on the basis that Title
VII protects "individuals" from differentiation on the basis of status
and that this individual right is not defined by probability associated
141
with status.
One would therefore further think that Manhartfalsifies the equalizing probabilities theory. This, however, is not the Allen authors'
view. First, they contend that the Court's emphasis upon Title VII's
protection of individual, rather than group, rights confirms their theory.142 This, however, is a peculiar view; it equates, I believe erroneously, the nonactuarial conception of individual right that the Court
invokes with the actuarial conception of individual right that the Allen
authors propose. Second, they embrace the Court's rationale for distinguishing Gilbert: the classification in Manhart was between allmale and all-female groups, whereas the classification in Gilbert was
between pregnant and non-pregnant persons, the latter including both
men and women. 143 The Court's distinction is typically thought to be
unpersuasive,'144 but the Allen authors think it is consistent with their
theory: overt sex classifications (as in Manhart) generate disparate
impact "by definition," neutral ones (as in Gilbert) do not. 145
This second effort to reconcile Manhart and Gilbert is also peculiar.
It trades on an assumption (one consistent with the Court's before the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act146)that pregnancy is not gender. That
assumption seems doubtful: if the insurance plan in Gilbert is viewed
as excluding protection against the risk of pregnancy, a view consistent with a probabilities approach, it would seem to entail an instance
of "overt sex classification" generating disparate impact "by definition."1 47 The capacity of the equalizing probabilities rationale to predict results accurately is therefore limited by its dependence upon a
further prediction outside the rationale-one about judicial characterization of the classification in issue.
Even given, however, an assumption that pregnancy is not gender,
the Allen authors' view of Manhartis peculiar. Why should "overt sex
classification" be thought to produce a disparate impact "by definition" when disparate impact is defined in terms of equalizing
probabilities? If it is the case that women outlive men, and if it is
141. Manhart, 435 U.S. at 709.
142. Allen et al., supra note 19, at 191.
143. Id. at 192 (relying on Manhart, 435 U.S. at 715).

144. See, e.g., Manhart, 435 U.S. at 723-25 (Blackmum, J., concurring).
145. Allen et al., supra note 19, at 192.
146. Title VII, section 701(k) now equates sex and pregnancy. Newport News Shipbuilding &
Dry Dock Co. v. E.E.O.C., 462 U.S. 669, 676-82 (1983).
147. Gilbert, 429 U.S. at 161-62 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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further the case that probabilities are to be equalized on the basis of
those supplied by status, the employer's compensation policy in Manhart would seem to have been compelled by Title VII, not prohibited
by it.148 Gilbert is clearly consistent with the Allen authors' theory,
but Manhart can be reconciled with that theory only by changing the
terms of reference.
To their credit, the Allen authors concede that Johnson Controls
may be read as sharply distinguishing disparate impact and disparate
treatment theories. 149 At issue in Johnson Controls was an employer
rule excluding women from a toxic work environment on the basis of
risks of fetal harm. 150 The court of appeals had treated this rule as
subject to the "business necessity" defense, a defense formally reserved for the disparate impact theory. 151 The Supreme Court rejected this treatment on the basis that the rule constituted facial
disparate treatment to which only the more limited BFOQ (bona fide
occupational qualification) defense was available.
The Allen authors reconcile Johnson Controls with their theory on
two bases. First, the Johnson Controls Court argued that "[t]he beneficence of an employer's purpose does not undermine the conclusion
that an explicit gender-based policy is sex discrimination."' 152 According to the Allen authors, this confirms the theory that illicit motive
serves merely an evidentiary role in establishing unequal probabilities.153 The difficulty with this view is that it confuses two senses of
the term "motive." It is clear that an express rule excluding women
requires a decision maker to identify the gender of an employee or
applicant for employment in applying the rule. This necessary reference to status is clearly what is meant by "illicit motive," "intentional
discrimination," or "disparate treatment."'1 54 It is equally clear that
the rationale for employing status as a basis for decision may be arguably "beneficent." Motive as rationale for use of status does not,
148. See, e.g., George J. Benston, The Economics of Gender Discrimination in Employee
Fringe Benefits: Manhart Revisited, 49 U. Cm. L. REv. 489, 494-505 (1982) (arguing that fairness

requires calculation on actuarial basis of value of fringe benefits to the individual); Spenser L.
Kimball, Reverse Sex Discrimination: Manhart, 1979 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 83, 99-104 (arguing

that the proper focus is upon the present actuarial value of the expected benefits and that there
is no unfair discrimination if they are equal).
149. Allen et al., supra note 19, at 208.

150. UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 886 F.2d 871 (7th Cir. 1989).
151. Id. at 887.
152. UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 200 (1991).
153. Allen et al., supra note 19, at 207.
154. Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 113 S. Ct. 1701, 1705 (1993); City of Los Angeles Dept. of
Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 711 (1978); see PAUL COX, 1 EMPLOYMENT DIsCRIMINATION § 7.01 (2d ed. 1992).
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however, obviate disparate treatment. Rather, motive as rationale is
typically invoked as a defense-the BFOQ under Title VII and "compelling" or "important" justifications within equal protection doctrine. 155 In short, the Court's rejection in Johnson Controls of the
notion that "beneficent purpose" obviates disparate treatment confirms the independence of the disparate treatment model; it does not
support the 56Allen authors' theory that illicit motive is merely
evidentiary.1
The second basis upon which the Allen authors seek to reconcile
Johnson Controls with their theory is that the Court's opinions may be
read as treating the BFOQ as a cost defense. 157 Although debatable,
this may be assumed for present purposes. The assumption's implication is thought by the Allen authors to support their view that there is
no substantial distinction between disparate treatment and disparate
impact theories, apparently because both "business necessity" and
BFOQ then become "adequate business justifications"' 158 for barriers
that produce unequal probabilities. The problem is that for this reading to be persuasive the matter of "adequate business justification"
must entail a unitary standard. If disparate treatment is merely evidence of disparate impact as unequal probability, 159 why should the
employer's excuse for this impact vary with the form of evidence?
This variation in form, however, is what is recognized in Johnson Conif "cost
trols: "business necessity" is a more lenient defense, 160 even
61
claim.'
BFOQ
a
analyzing
in
can be a legitimate factor
None of what has been said here in rebuttal of the Allen authors'
theory obviates, however, the claim that the Allen authors' theory fits,
sans its claim to an "individual orientation,"'162 many of the Supreme
Court's Title VII precedents. In particular, the equalizing probabilities theory "fits" Connecticut v. Teal, albeit for a reason distinct from
that which the Allen authors articulate. Recall that Teal rejects the
155. See, e.g., Personnel Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979).

156. This equating of motive with rationale also places in question other of the Allen authors'
views of the Supreme Court's disparate treatment precedent. To the extent that they mean "rationale" by their use of the term "motive," it is clear that they are correct in rejecting "motive"
as a required element of even a disparate treatment theory. But this would not itself justify their
further belief that all Title VII cases are disparate impact cases. The difference between the

Allen authors and me on this matter may lie in distinct conceptions of "causation." Their probabilistic view is distinct from my common law or conventionalist view.
157. Allen et al., supra note 19, at 208.

158. Id. at 177.
159. Id. at 177-78.
160. UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 198 (1991).
161. Allen et al., supra note 19, at 208.

162. id. at 200.
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"bottom line" defense: a barrier generating a disparate impact is subject to attack under the impact model regardless of proportional rep164
resentation of the group adversely affected. 163 The Allen authors
and Professors Paetzold and Willborn 165 say that this is because individuals adversely affected by the barrier were harmed. However, they
were harmed, in the sense of harm rendered material by an equalizing
probabilities theory, by the lower probability of selection given by
group selection rates. The barrier produced long-run distributional
harm, the harm of a risk of group exclusion, regardless of the employer's effort to achieve by alternative means "bottom line" balance.
The Allen theory may also "fit" the Supreme Court's affirmative
action cases, 166 despite, as the Allen authors recognize, the tension
between their theory and those cases. 167 The persuasive Allen explanation of the cases is that "when merit runs out" (when job-related
qualifications are controlled for), random selection or affirmative action are the sole means remaining of selecting employees. 168 Random
selection from qualified subpopulations would, in the long run, generate proportionate representation and would provide equal probabilities of selection. However, it would also render the employer's BFOQ
163. See supra notes 40-46 and accompanying text.
164. Allen et al., supra note 19, at 196.
165. Paetzold & Willborn, supra note 1, at 358-59.
166. See, e.g., Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987); United Steelworkers v.
Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
167. Allen et al., supra note 19, at 196-97 (indicating that their theory does not predict the
affirmative action cases). The Allen authors deny that Teal is inconsistent with the affirmative
action cases. Id. at 196 n.139. They do so, however, on the basis of an interpretation of these
cases, see infra notes 168-69 and accompanying text, which they concede requires a "tight constraint" in interpreting them. Id. at 197. My disagreement entails some fundamental differences
in the definition of terms. For example, the Allen authors say that individuals received "perfectly equal treatment" in the affirmative action cases. Id. at 196 n.139. As it is clear, however,
that the affirmative action plans at issue "favored members of particular groups," id. at 198, I fail
to see how the individuals disfavored under such plans received "perfectly equal treatment."
Another example: the Allen authors say that a group rights theory fails to predict the affirmative action cases because "whites and males were discriminated against as groups." Id. at 197. It
is not, however, the case that whites and males were discriminated against as groups in the
affirmative action cases (even though they were discriminated against as individuals). As white
and male proportion is maintained under affirmative action plans meeting the Supreme Court's
requirements, these plans entail no "group discrimination."
In my view, there is a tension between Teal and the affirmative action cases because the latter
imply that proportional representation is the legal objective and Teal's rejection of a bottom-line
balance defense removes an employer incentive to this end. Teal may be consistent with the
affirmative action cases, however, if proportional representation is understood, not in terms of
short-term proportion in particular work forces, but, rather, as long-term proportion to be
achieved by imposing liability for employer practices that give effect to group differences. This
latter possibility is quite close to the Allen authors' theory, but it remains in my view a group
rights theory.
168. Id. at 199.
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questionable where particular samples deviate by reason of chance
from expected proportion. 169 Affirmative action is the employer's
170
means of obviating this risk.
This variation on an "arguable violation" theory of affirmative action 171 is quite plausible. Indeed, and despite the reservations the Allen authors express about the consistency of their theory with
affirmative action, 172 it would seem a predictable consequence of their
theory. The employer incentive structure generated by an equalizing
probabilities mandate points to proportional representation of groups
by imposing costs of justification on criteria generating unequal
probabilities. 173 Moreover, affirmative action, when "goals" are tied
to the composition of qualified populations, serves to equalize
probabilities despite the disparate treatment it necessarily entails.
United Steelworkers v. Weber resembles GeneralElectric Co. v. Gilbert
in this respect: there is no liability for disparate treatment if there is
no disparate effect. The tension between the Allen authors' theory
and "voluntary" affirmative action that troubles the Allen authors
again lies in the characterization of the theory as generating an "individual right,"'174 but the tension disappears if it is recognized that this
right is defined in terms of a probability and that this probability is
determined by group status.
III.

EQUAL ACHIEVEMENT AND APPROXIMATED DISPARATE
TREATMENT

Professors Paetzold and Willborn reject two rationales for the disparate impact model: an equal achievement rationale and an approximated disparate treatment rationale. 175 The Allen authors reject at
least the latter of these rationales as they think that the disparate
treatment prohibition is an evidentiary means of attacking disparate
impact, the treatment prohibition "approximates" the impact prohibition, rather than the other way around.' 76 Willborn, Paetzold, and the
Allen authors also think that an "anti-barriers" rationale is both dis169. Id. at 199-200.

170. Id. A somewhat similar explanation of affirmative action is presented in Cox, Affirmative Action, supra note 79, at 835-51.
171. See Johnson v. Transportation Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 647-57 (1987) (O'Connor, J., conconcurring).
curring); United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 209-12 (1979) (Blackmun, J.,
172. Allen et al., supra note 19, at 197-98.

173. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio, 490 U.S. 642, 652-53, 659 (1989); Watson v. Fort
Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 991-93 (1988) (plurality opinion); Cox, Affirmative Action,
supra note 79, at 786-90, 795-808.
174. Allen et al., supra note 19, at 197-98.

175. Paetzold & Willbom, supra note 1, at 368-74.
176. Allen et al., supra note 19, at 177.
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tinct from an equal achievement rationale and an approximated disparate treatment rationale and is a better explanation of Title VII cases
177
than either.
What is at stake in these questions? One matter at stake is an incoherence thesis. The equal achievement and approximated disparate
treatment rationales were borrowed by this writer from Professor Fiss
of
to argue that Title VII precedent was internally inconsistent: some 178
the precedent supports one of the rationales and some the other.
An implication of the incoherence argument is clearly that distinct
political commitments determine the impact model's function in particular cases. The equal achievement rationale is that the model's
function is to effect proportional distribution of employment opportunity by status-a state-determined distributive end-state. The approximated disparate treatment rationale is that the model's function is to
"overenforce" the disparate treatment prohibition, capturing suspected or subtle disparate treatment in the prohibitory net. The overenforcement theory, if correct, arguably. reinforces an incoherence
argument because the theory postulates both a pure disparate treatment theory that underinclusively attacks illicitly motivated employment action (by placing greater litigation risk on plaintiffs) and an
approximated disparate treatment theory that overinclusively attacks
illicitly motivated employment action (by placing greater risk on
defendants). 179
Apart, however, from this species of incoherence, the approximation rationale enables constraints on the implications of the impact
model and, therefore, reflects a political commitment opposed to
these implications. The implications are those argued in the preceding
sections of this response and captured in the equal achievement rationale-that the model functions as an ensurer of the distributive
objectives of the state. The approximation rationale confines the
model, rendering it less efficacious as a means to such ends and more
consistent with a "corrective justice" baseline. As I share a commitment to that baseline, I favor an effort to confine the model.
The anti-barriers rationale responds to these contentions at two
levels. If viable, it both rebuts the claim of incoherence and rebuts the
claim that the source of incoherence lies in commitments to clashing
political moralities. The question would therefore seem to be whether
it is viable. Viability requires that the anti-barrier rationale is distinct
177. Id. at 176-79; Paetzold & Willborn, supra note 1, at 368-74.
178. Cox, Affirmative Action, supra note 79, at 806-08; Cox, Substance and Process,supra note
23, at 49-53.
179. Cox, Substance and Process, supra note 23, at 108-17.
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from both of its competitors. The argument now to be presented is
that it is not.
A. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust
The strongest argument in precedent for the anti-barrier view, particularly as that view is articulated by the Allen authors, is arguably
Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust.180 The plurality opinion in Watson is noteworthy for three reasons: (1) it (along with concurring
opinions) declares that the impact model is applicable to subjective
criteria; (2) it foreshadows the later majority opinion in Wards Cove
(by requiring plaintiff identification of the "particular criterion" or
"barrier" attacked and proof that the criterion caused impact and by
relaxing the business necessity defense); and (3) it eliminated from
contention a perpetration of societal discrimination rationale for the
impact model (one that would limit the "barriers" subject to attack
under the model to those that "give effect" to some overt instance of
discrimination by third parties).""
The Allen authors believe that Watson supports their equalizing
probabilities version of an anti-barrier rationale. They do so on the
basis that the plurality and concurring opinions both indicate that motivation is superfluous under Title VII.182 They quote the following
passage from the plurality opinion for the first proposition:
[W]e are also persuaded that disparate impact analysis is in principle no less applicable to subjective employment criteria than to objective or standardized tests. In either case, a facially neutral
practice, adopted without discriminatory intent, may have effects
that are indistinguishable from intentionally discriminatory practices .... Furthermore, even if one assumed that any such discrimination can be adequately policed through disparate treatment
analysis, the problem of subconscious stereotypes and prejudices
would remain .... If an employer's undisciplined system of subjective decision-making has precisely the same effects as a system pervaded by impermissible intentional discrimination, it is difficult to
see why Title VII's proscription against discriminatory actions
should not apply. In both circumstances, the employer's practices
180. 487 U.S. 977 (1988).

181. Id. at 988-99. The limited version of the anti-barriers rationale was suggested both by
Griggs' reliance on segregated education as a reason for disparate effect, see supra notes 28-29
and accompanying text, and by the remedial rationale for affirmative action, see United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208 (1979) (finding "traditionally segregated job categories").
Its rejection is indicated by Watson and by the Court's conversion of "segregated job category"
(a phenomenon attributable to systematic disparate treatment on the part of the craft unions in
Weber) into "social discrimination" (understood as any distributional disparity regardless of its
causes) in Johnson v. TransportationAgency, 480 U.S. 616 (1987).
182. Allen et al., supra note 19, at 201.
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may be said to "adversely affect [an individual's] status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2). We conclude,
accordingly, that subjective or discretionary employment practices
may be analyzed
under the disparate impact approach in appropri18 3
ate cases.

According to the Allen authors, this means that Title VII prohibits
"unjustified impediments" to individual achievement and that "the
employer's motivation for placing the impediments does not matter."'1 84 At one level, this characterization is quite plausible. The plurality opinion, again foreshadowing Wards Cove, is clearly suggesting
in the quoted passage a convergence of treatment and impact models,
a convergence confirmed by its (and Wards Cove's) effort to render
the impact model's procedural elements-in particular the burden of
persuasion and a relaxed version of the business necessity defensemore consistent with disparate treatment precedent. It surely is also
the case that the quoted passage equates the effect of disparate treatment and disparate impact: in the plurality's words (not quoted
above), impact theory attacks employment practices that "in opera185
tion [are] functionally equivalent to intentional discrimination."'
Notice, however, that intentional discrimination (disparate treatment) is the paradigm in this statement; impact theory is limited by
the statement to "functional equivalence." Motivation is "irrelevant"
to disparate impact theory but only in the sense that functional equivalence is a substitute for illicit motivation. Illicit motivation is the passage's contemplated "core" of Title VII's prohibitions and functional
equivalence is the "penumbra."
The Allen authors' reading seeks to make unequal probability the
core. The reading is supported by the passage's emphasis upon
equivalent effects, at least if equivalence is understood in terms of
probability. Is this, however, the Watson plurality's understanding of
the effects in question? First, note that the plurality's example of
equivalent effects is the effects of "subconscious stereotypes and prejudice."' 8 6 It is true that "conscious prejudice" is not "conscious motivation," but a decision caused by unconscious prejudice closely
resembles a decision caused by conscious motivation. In both decisions, the effects are produced by status, as such, in the mind of the

183. Id. at 202 (citing Watson, 487 U.S. at 990-91).
184. Id.
185. Watson, 487 U.S. at 987.

186. Id. at 990.
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decider. 187 Moreover, a portion of the plurality opinion omitted from
the quoted passage strongly indicates that risks of disparate treatment
generated by subjective processes motivated the plurality's extension
of the impact model. 188 The "effects" with which the plurality was
concerned in the passage, therefore, appear intimately connected to a
particular type of reason for these effects, a reason narrower than a
correlation between a "barrier" and status.
Second, and more importantly, the Watson plurality's discussion of
the effects of subjective criteria cannot be separated from its discussion of business necessity. This separation of the meaning of "impact"
from the meaning of business necessity characterizes both the
Paetzold and Willborn analysis and the Allen authors' analysis.
Paetzold and Willborn view business necessity as a mere "constraint
on the [impact] model's power" and as having "very little to do with
discrimination directly."' 89 The Allen authors never directly address
the meaning or role of business necessity, but their theory generally
suggests a view similar to that of Paetzold and Willborn. 190 The difficulty with these views is that the incoherence thesis-the thesis that
the impact model may be manipulated to function either as an equal
achievement or as an approximated disparate treatment theory-rests
primarily upon the distinct contents that may be assigned business
necessity. 19 '
The latter manipulation is evident in the Watson plurality opinion.
The plurality opinion, rather, expressly suggests the necessity of accounting for both "impact" and the content of the defense in establishing the meaning of the impact model by stating that Title VII's
anti-quota provision means "that employers are not required to avoid
187. Cf. David A. Strauss, DiscriminatoryIntent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U. Cn. L. REV.

935, 957 (1989) (reversing the groups test of disparate treatment).
188. Watson, 487 U.S. at 990. That portion reads as follows:
It is true, to be sure, that an employer's policy of leaving promotion decisions to the
unchecked discretion of lower level supervisors should itself raise no inference of discriminatory conduct. Especially in relatively small businesses like respondent's, it may

be customary and quite reasonable simply to delegate employment decisions to those
employees who are most familiar with the jobs to be filled and with the candidates for
those jobs. It does not follow, however, that the particular supervisors to whom this
discretion is delegated always act without discriminatoryintent.
Id. (emphasis added)
189. See Paetzold & Willborn, supra note 1, at 369.
190. See Allen et al., supra note 19, at 177 (expressing theory in terms of "unjustified" barriers

marginally diminishing employment prospects).
191. Cox, Affirmative Action, supra note 79, at 786-90; Cox, Substance and Process,supra note
23, at 95-97; cf George Rutherglen, Disparate Impact Under Title VII: An Objective Theory of
Discrimination,73 VA. L. REV. 1297, 1308-11 (1987) (discussing the use of disparate impact
theory as means of attacking pretext).
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'disparate impact' as such."' 92 The Court then recognizes that, absent
the "evidentiary safeguards" that it goes on to supply, the impact
model would generate "quotas and preferential treatment" to avoid
imbalances in work force composition-a clear reference to the "risk"
of an equal achievement function. 193 Finally, the Court strengthens
the business necessity "defense" by imposing the risk of non-persuasion on the plaintiff and, at least as importantly, by relaxing the standards under which it is assessed. Thus, according to the Watson
plurality, validation studies are not required even for objective criteria; 194 a "manifest relationship" between an employment criterion and
employment is established if the criterion "significantly serves" a legit195
Furthermore,
imate purpose even though not "required" by it.
courts should recognize that they are less competent than employers
196
in assessing employment practices.
These pronouncements add up to a "reasonableness" test of business necessity. That test's relevance to the meaning of "discrimination" under the impact model is that "impact as such," under the
particular line of precedent represented by Watson, 197 is not prohib-

ited; rather, impact generated by a "barrier" unsupported by a "reasonable" relationship to a business purpose is suspect. Business
necessity is, therefore, not a constraint on discrimination understood
as an undesirable effect nor an invitation to judicial balancing of distributional objectives and business interests. Rather, business necessity, understood in terms of reasonableness, is intimately connected to
the content of that which is prohibited: effects "functionally
equivalent" to disparate treatment because not plausibly explained by
a business reason independent of status.
There is, of course, an alternative version of "business necessity,"
one that would require validation, 98 view "manifest relationship" as
requiring "essentiality,"' 99 reject judicial deference to employer judgment, and impose a risk of non-persuasion on defendants. The alternative version, an alternative manipulation of the defense, is that
192.
Rights
193.
194.
195.
196.

Watson, 487 U.S. at 992. The Civil Rights Act contains an anti-quota provision. Civil
Act (Title VII) § 703(j), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1994).
Watson, 487 U.S. at 993.
Id. at 998.
See id. (quoting New York Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 587 n.31 (1979)).
See id. at 999.

197. Other lines of precedent suggest a quite distinct understanding. See infra notes 198-99
and accompanying text.
198. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425-36 (1975).

199. See, e.g., E.E.O.C. v. Rath Packing Co., 787 F.2d 318, 332 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
910 (1986); Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S.
1006 (1971).
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advocated by the dissent in Watson,200 later by the dissent in Wards
Cove20 and, perhaps, but problematically, adopted in the Civil Rights
Act of 1991.202 This version would warrant the view that business necessity is a mere "constraint on the model's power" because it would
operate as a modest brake on the distributive implications of a prohibition of disparate effect. It is, however, no less a version of the defense intimately connected to the meaning of discrimination under the
impact model because the costs of justification it would impose on
employers would clearly imply that "disparate impact as such" is discrimination. This point is clearly evident in the portion of the dissenting opinion in Watson relied upon by the Allen authors:
The prima facie case of disparate impact established by a showing of
significant statistical disparity is notably different from a prima facie
showing of disparate treatment. Unlike a claim of intentional discrimination, which the McDonnell Douglas factors establish only by
inference, the disparate impact caused by an employment practice is
directly established by the numerical disparity. Once an employment practice is shown to have discriminatory consequences, an employer can escape liability only if it persuades the court that the
selection process producing the disparity has "a manifest relationship to the employment in question." [Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S.
440, 446 (1982), quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,
432 (1971).] The plaintiff in such a case has proved that the employthe employer to
ment practice has an impropereffect; it is now up20to
effect is justified. 3

prove that the discriminatory
The Allen authors quote this passage in the dissenting opinion in support of a contention that it is the "unjustified discriminatory effect
that violates Title VII."' 2°4 This is clearly an accurate characterization
of the Watson dissent's view. Contrary to what the Allen authors say
and what Paetzold and Willborn imply by treating business necessity
as a "constraint on power," it is not the Watson plurality's (or the
Wards Cove majority's) view. It is precisely the "impropriety" of disparate effect "as such" that the Watson plurality is at pains to deny:
°
"employers are not required to avoid 'disparate impact' as such. 205
Nevertheless, there is an interpretation of the Allen theory that
would render it "functionally equivalent" to the Watson plurality's position. Although the Allen authors do not directly address the content
200. 487 U.S. at 1000-11 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
201. 490 U.S. at 662-79 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
202. See supra note 16 (discussing the ambiguities of the 1991 Act).
203. Allen et al., supra note 19, at 203 (citing Watson, 487 U.S. at 1004) (emphasis added).
204. Id.
205. 487 U.S. at 992; see supra notes 192-96 and accompanying text (discussing the plurality
opinion in Watson).
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of business necessity, suppose that they would agree with the plurality's version of the defense. Such agreement is perhaps suggested by
their discussion of the ease with which employers can defend subjective criteria. 206 On the assumption that this is their view, Watson and
Wards Cove may be plausibly read both as "homogenizing the proof
rules in Title VII litigation" and as moving toward a single understanding of Title VII's prohibition. 20 7 Moreover, this single understanding might then plausibly be characterized as a prohibition of
"unreasonable" barriers that "marginally diminish prospects." Such a
characterization, however, would be functionally indistinct from an
"approximated disparate treatment" characterization unless it were
taken to preclude liability for disparate treatment in the absence of
disparate effect (as in the Allen authors' reading of Gilbert).208 If the
"unreasonable barriers" characterization were not so understood so
that disparate treatment could generate liability even absent disparate
impact, the approximation theory would seem the better of the
characterizations.
B.

The Paetzold and Wiliborn Case Against Equal Achievement
and Approximated Disparate Treatment: A Rebuttal

1. Equal Achievement
Recall that Professors Paetzold and Willborn argue that "without
constraints" their "blindered causation" version of the impact model
"would articulate a strong equal achievement conception of equality."' 2 09 This is entirely plausible. Indeed, it is a variation on the
themes argued above. Nevertheless, Paetzold and Willborn reject the
equal achievement rationale for two reasons. First, the requirement
that a particular employment practice be identified and the business
necessity defense have "little to do with discrimination directly" and,
therefore, operate as "constraints" on the model's power. 210 These
show that productivity concerns "limit pursuit of the 'equal achievement' concept of equality. '211 Second, the Supreme Court's rejection
of "bottom line balance" in Teal and rejection of prima facie liability
206. Allen et al., supra note 19, at 203.

207. Id. at 203-04 (taking this homogenization view of Wards Cove). This homogenization
was, however, at least partially blocked by the 1991 Act, see supra note 16, which was enacted
after the publication of the Allen authors' article.
208. Allen et al., supra note 19, at 183-84.
209. Paetzold & Willborn, supra note 1, at 368.
210. Id. at 369.
211. Id.
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for "bottom line imbalance" in Watson are inconsistent with an equal
212
achievement objective.
Consider the first of these arguments. It is quite correct that the
"particular employment practice" and "business necessity" defense
operate as "constraints on the power" of the impact model. 213 The
question is how much constraint they impose. The less particular the
required identification and the more justification required for business
necessity, the less constraint on "power." The less constraint on
"power," the more it is true that the "blindered" impact model "articulate[s] a strong equal achievement conception of equality. ' 21 4 It is,
therefore, untrue that the "particular requirement" and "business ne'215
cessity" matters have "little to do with discrimination directly.
They have everything to do with it, precisely because their substantive
content determines the direction in which the impact model moves
along a spectrum, the terminal poles of which are distinct conceptions
of equality. The Wards Cove majority moved the impact model in the
direction of the disparate treatment pole. The Wards Cove dissent and
the more problematic congressional reaction to Wards Cove216 move
the impact model in the direction of the equal achievement pole.
These events confirm the incoherence thesis.
Consider, now, Paetzold and Willborn's second argument, one from
bottom-line balance and imbalance. It is quite correct that Teal's rejection of bottom-line balance as a defense and Wards Cove's rejection
of prima facie liability for bottom-line imbalance are inconsistent with
an equal achievement objective, at least if that objective is understood
in terms of proportionate distribution of employment by status in each
particular work force.2 17 If Teal and Wards Cove were combined with
the relaxed version of business necessity articulated in Wards Cove,
the functional result would be to move the impact model substantially
in the direction of an approximated disparate treatment prohibition
and, therefore, to confirm that the resulting model is not one of equal
achievement. 218 Suppose instead, however, that the Civil Rights Act
of 1991 is interpreted not only as imposing the risk of nonpersuasion
212. Id. at 368-69 n.142.
213. Id. at 369.
214. Id. at 368.

215. Id. at 369.
216. See supra note 16.
217. An alternative understanding of "equal achievement," however, is "long-run" distributional equity, as suggested by equalizing probabilities.
218. Cf. Allen v. Seidman, 881 F.2d 375, 381 (7th Cir. 1989) (suggesting that, under Wards

Cove, business necessity "should perhaps be renamed the 'issue of legitimate employer
purpose'").
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regarding business necessity on employers (which it clearly does) but
also as overturning Wards Cove's relaxed version of the substantive
219
standards for assessing "necessity" (which it may or may not do).
The consequence would then be to confirm incoherence: impact is
defined in such a way (by virtue of rejection of bottom-line measurements) as to render direct pursuit of "equal achievement" out of
bounds, but business necessity would be defined in such a way that it
would not impose a substantial constraint on the "power" of blindered
causation to generate equal achievement.
Perhaps, however, this is incorrect. Perhaps the result would then
be, as what Professors Paetzold and Willborn suggest, an "anti-barriers" conception of the impact model distinct from an equal achievement objective. The problem with this view lies in the reason for
thinking an anti-barriers conception is distinct. The reason, again, is
that the particularity (non-bottom-line measurement) requirement
and business necessity defense operate as constraints on the power of
the model to generate equal achievement. 220 So the reason "at bottom" is that the anti-barriers view is less efficacious in generating
equal achievement than it would be absent these constraints. This can
be conceded, but the concession does not obviate the equal achievement implications of an anti-barrier view. The employer-incentive
structure generated by the anti-barrier view (assuming a strict business necessity requirement for justification) remains that of foregoing
"barriers" and substituting proportional distribution. 221 Perhaps
Professors Paetzold and Willborn recognize this in their statement
that "the anti-barrier role [of their theory] can fit roughly into the
equal achievement rationale. ' 222 Nevertheless, a "rough" equal
achievement rationale remains an equal achievement rationale.
2. Disparate Treatment
According to Professors Paetzold and Willborn, the "blindered
treatment of causation under the disparate impact model makes the
[approximated disparate treatment prohibition] explanation of [the
impact model's] function very unsatisfying. '223 The reasons offered
are these:
219. See supra note 16.
220. Paetzold & Willbom, supra note 1, at 368-69.
221. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 991-93 (1988); cf. Allen et al., supra
note 19, at 199-200 (treating affirmative action as a means of avoiding adverse inferences when
"merit runs out").
222. Paetzold & Willborn, supra note 1, at 377.
223. Id. at 372.
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If the goal is to approximate the results of intention-based models,
one would hardly expect the model to ignore relevant-indeed,
even conclusive-evidence of intent....

Evidence that a disparity

was caused in part by social conditions may well undermine any inference that the employer caused the disparity intentionally-but
such evidence is irrelevant for a disparate impact claim. Evidence
that the employer selected a criterion for the purpose of screening
out blacks is crucial for an intent-based model-but irrelevant for a
disparate impact claim. Evidence that a criterion has a disparate
impact when considered individually, but no disparate screening effect when an employer used it in combination with other criteria,
would tend to undermine an intent-based claim-but would be irrelevant to a disparate impact claim.22 4
This argument rests on the assumption of "blindered causation. 2 25
The "stratification lens" articulated by Professors Paetzold and
Willborn generally precludes examination of social causes of a disparity, and such causes would rebut illicit motive as the cause of a disparity. Moreover, the "concurrence lens" would permit disaggregation
and aggregation of criteria in an effort to discover disparities, but this
process of discovering hidden disparities implies that the employer
was unaware of them, a state of ignorance inconsistent with a discriminatory "purpose."
One obvious line of response is to attack the "blindered" premise of
the argument, but this exercise is postponed to the final section of this
response. 22 6 At present, the premise will be assumed. Upon that
premise, the Paetzold and Willborn argument is well taken: blindered
causation is indeed inconsistent with a prohibition merely of illicit motivation. Is a prohibition merely of illicit motivation, however, what is
meant by an "approximated disparate treatment prohibition"?
Illicit motivation certainly is part of what is meant by an approximation theory, for such a theory captures within its net "suspected disparate treatment" as pretextual use of status-neutral criteria. It would
seem apparent, however, that the "functional equivalence" notion underlying the approximation theory is at least potentially broader than
a mere targeting of pretext. In the first place, the approximation rationale can be understood as targeting in part "unconscious preju224. Id. at 372-73.
225. Paetzold and Willbom also argue, however, that self-selection (lack of interest in some
jobs by some groups) should not be taken into account in assessing disparate impact. Id. at 373
n.160. If not taken into account, the irrelevance of self-selection to disparate impact is inconsistent with an approximated disparate treatment rationale for the disparate impact model. A difficulty with this argument is that Wards Cove suggests expressly that self-selection should be taken
into account. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio, 490 U.S. 642, 653-54 (1989).
226. See infra notes 232-63 and accompanying text.
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dice. '227 Disparate treatment, on this account, is a causal notion,
albeit one requiring the defendant's conscious or unconscious use of
status as a criterion for decision. 228 In the second place, the approximation theory can be understood as targeting risks of disparate treatment. It is true that a judicial refusal to stratify, and therefore to
consider social causes of a disparity, precludes a defendant's reliance
upon such social causes as reasons independent of status for the disparity, even where the defendant was unaware of these causes. 229 It is
also true, however, that the question of the defendant's awareness, if
placed in issue, generates risks of judicial error. Overenforcing the
disparate treatment prohibition by excluding awareness as an issue, in
circumstances where both "blindered disparities" and an "unreasonable" justification for the employment criterion generating them are
present, allocates this risk to defendants. 230 The same point obviously
may be made about the possibility of employer ignorance of disparities discovered through the concurrence lens.
It is, of course, the case that a form of incoherence is suggested by
an overenforcement explanation of "approximation." Why should the
risk of judicial error be so heavily imposed on plaintiffs in pure disparate treatment cases, but instead be heavily imposed on defendants in
approximation cases? Perhaps the presence of substantial disparities
justifies this distinction, 231 but perhaps it does not.
Apart from pretext, unconscious prejudice and risks of disparate
treatment, the approximation rationale should be understood as an
approximation-asthe direction in which the disparate impact theory
may be made (or manipulated) to point. To clarify this depiction, consider the following story. Assume that a hypothetical Supreme Court
Justice is committed to the disparate treatment prohibition pole on
the spectrum of possible conceptions of equality. Assume, further,
that the Justice is stuck with Griggs v. Duke Power Co. as precedent.
Given that she is stuck with Griggs, it remains possible to exploit its
ambiguities in a way that minimizes the "equal achievement" implications of the precedent. An obvious possibility is to relax the business
necessity "defense." The result, from this hypothetical Justice's perspective, will be less than perfect, but it is a result closer to, and therefore an approximation of, the one she favors. It is, of course, also
227. See supra notes 186-87 and accompanying text.
228. Cox, supra note 154, § 7.01[3].
229. Paetzold & Willborn, supra note 1, at 372.
230. Cox, Substance and Process, supra note 23, at 108-18.
231. Id. at 109.
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possible to tell a different story, one about a Justice favoring an opposite pole and inclined to point the impact model in the other direction.
IV.

ON STRATIFICATION AND CONCURRENCE

A. Stratification
Consider, again, the story of the Justice committed to a disparate
treatment prohibition pole in her understanding of equality. Call her
the Reactionary Justice (the modifier being used here with a sense of
ironic pride). What would she think of Professors Paetzold and
Willborn's concurrence and stratification lenses? It was earlier conceded that the "blindered" version of causation generated by these
lenses may be inconsistent with a pure disparate treatment modelone targeted at illicit motivation and one that, in good individualist
and common law fashion, places risks of judicial error on plaintiffs
and, therefore, assumes the legitimacy of the distributive status quo. 232
Our hypothetical Justice is therefore unlikely to favor blindered causation. Her hypothetical counterpart, the Justice committed to the opposite pole, is just as likely to favor blindered causation.
Consider, first, the matter of stratification. This requires a brief attempt to summarize the Paetzold and Willborn analysis, utilizing an
233
example they present. The example is an employer's use of a test.
The test may generate a disparate impact among test takers or it may
not. Assume, first, that it does when the data is aggregated, i.e., all
test takers are considered without reference to variables other than
status. However, if the data is disaggregated so as to account for another variable, education, disparate impact disappears: there is no
pass-rate difference by status within the subgroup of test takers with
college degrees and no pass-rate difference by status within the subcategory of test takers without college degrees.
In short, there is on this assumption a disparate impact when heterogenous persons with respect to education level are considered, but
there is no disparate impact when homogeneous persons with respect
to education level are considered. The situation is ripe for what
Paetzold and Willborn term a defensive use of stratification. 234 In
their scheme, however, the employer may not argue that it is not responsible for the effects of a criterion it does not use (education level)
or for education level as a social cause of the (aggregate) disparity. 235
232. See supra notes 225-27 and accompanying text.

233. Paetzold & Willborn, supra note 1, at 336-42.
234. Id. at 390.
235. Id. at 393.
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Rather, the employer may employ stratification (the disaggregated
level of analysis) only to argue that "business necessity" justifies the
employer's implicit use of education level as an employment criterion.236 Paetzold and Willborn would therefore permit a "weak" defensive use of stratification. An alternative, call it a "strong"
defensive use, would deny that the employer is responsible for the
effects of education. Our Reactionary Justice would prefer strong defensive use.
Now consider an alternative assumption: no disparate effect is displayed at the aggregate level, but one is detected where the data is
disaggregated. Thus, when the data is considered without reference to
the education level of test takers, there is no pass-rate difference by
status. When, instead, the data is divided by education level, there is a
pass-rate difference in one education level category but not the other
(or there is a pass-rate difference of different magnitudes in both, or
there is a pass-rate difference favoring one status in one category and
the other status in the other category). The situation is ripe for what
Paetzold and Willborn term an offensive use of stratification: the
237
plaintiff seeks to disaggregate data in search of disparate effect.
Professors Paetzold and Willborn would permit this offensive use to
the extent that the stratifying variable (e.g., education level) is reason238
ably related to the employer's express criterion (e.g., the test).
They would also again permit the employer to justify the stratifying
variable as required by business necessity. 239
What would Reactionary Justice think of an offensive use of stratification? She obviously would object. The plaintiff again seeks to
render the employer responsible for a "social cause" of a disparity
and, therefore, to use the employer as an instrument for effecting the
distributive end-state the plaintiff hopes the state will adopt as its objective. For simplicity's sake, call this opposition an extension of Reactionary's inclination to adopt "strong defensive use of stratification"
as law.
236. The Paetzold and Willborn analysis is more complex than suggested in the text because it
addresses both "confounding effects" and "interaction effects." Id. at 339-40. A confounding
effect occurs when aggregated data eliminates or reduces the effect that would be observed were
the data stratified (as where no disparity exists in the aggregate). Id. An interaction effect occurs where interaction between the variables (e.g., test and education level) generates, in effect,

a third variable (interaction) that may affect subgroups differently. See id. at 340. This more
complex analysis, however, does not affect Paetzold and Willborn's legal recommendations or
the critique in the text.
237. Id. at 395.
238. Id. at 396.
239. Id. at 396-97.
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If strong defensive stratification, contrary to the weak defensive
stratification depicted by Paetzold and Willborn, is possible, either as
a required aspect of the plaintiff's case or as a potential means of rebutting disparate effect, Griggs can be largely interred, even as an approximated disparate treatment theory. The reason is that quite
plausibly suggested by Paetzold and Willborn: the model would no
longer be "blind" to social causes outside the control of employers.
The implication is that employers would be relieved of legal responsibility for these social causes; their use of neutral criteria that "give
effect" to socially caused disparities would not itself be deemed
discrimination.
Is this a possibility? Paetzold and Willborn think not, for the plausible reasons that a strong defensive stratification was not done in
Griggs and its progeny and that doing so would indeed help to inter
Griggs.240 Strong defensive stratification is not, however, beyond the
realm of possibility. In the first place, the congressional failure to define disparate impact in the Civil Rights Act of 1991 places no textual
bar to strong defensive stratification. One may, of course, say that the
1991 Act's "spirit" would be violated, but there is no agreement, including among the legislators who enacted the legislation, 41 about the
meaning of the impact model and, therefore, no congressional agreement about spirit. There is also no judicial agreement that spirit is
controlling. 242 Absent an intelligible spirit, it is therefore possible to
say that Wards Cove survives the 1991 Act to the extent not textually
overturned and that it is textually overturned only to the extent of its
allocation of risk of non-persuasion. Wards Cove, while it certainly
does not compel strong defensive stratification, at least provides a basis for it.
Specifically, recall that the Court in Wards Cove objected to the
plaintiff's use of the cannery work force as an assumed source for
skilled noncannery workers on the ground that the former was not a
"pool of qualified job applicants. 2 43 A possible implication is that
plaintiffs must account for qualifications, even if not expressly required by an employer, in establishing the subpopulation of persons
relevant to assessment of the effect of a particular, challenged criterion. 244 The Court's reason for its qualified labor pool requirement
240. See id. at 352-64.
241. See 137 CONG. REc. S15362 (daily ed. Oct. 29, 1991) (statements of Senators Danforth,

Kennedy, Hatch and Dole). The authors of the legislation do not seem to agree about its
meaning.
242. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. Cm.L. REV. 1175, 1183 (1989).
243. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio, 490 U.S. 642, 651-55 (1989).

244. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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309

suggests this implication: "If the absence of minorities holding...
skilled positions is due to a dearth of qualified nonwhite applicants
(for reasons that are not [the employer's] fault) [the employer's] selection methods ...

cannot be said to have had a 'disparate impact' on

nonwhites. '245 Other readings of this aspect of Wards Cove are possible (most particularly one that limits the qualified labor pool requirement to that of accounting for unchallenged express qualification
requirements), but so, too, is a strong defensive stratification
46
reading.2
Would a strong defensive stratification reading of Wards Cove be so
inconsistent with Griggs as to be precluded (it being clear from the
1991 Act at least that Griggs, whatever its meaning or spirit, has been
codified)? Perhaps, but the Allen authors have ironically provided a
line of argument (twisted from their original intent) for saying otherwise. The Allen authors suggest a reading of Title VII precedent from
a sufficiency of evidence perspective: the precedent is largely about
sufficiency, not articulation of substantive principle. 247 Consider an
application of this line of argument to Griggs: the fact that the Court
did not address stratification does not imply that it is unavailable defensively; the Court merely deemed the evidence before it as sufficient. This reading requires that the implications of an argument
made by the Court in Griggs-that disparities in test performance are
attributable to discrimination in education-be downplayed. 248 That
argument implies that employers are to be responsible for criteria that
give effect to disparities generated by other criteria that are not expressly required, an implication obviously inconsistent with strong defensive stratification. Ignoring the implications of precedent is not,
however, alien to judicial technique. The referenced argument in
Griggs also implies that the barriers subject to attack under the impact
model may be limited to those that give effect to particular instances
of "social discrimination"-an implication interred in Watson and re249
jected by Paetzold and Willborn.
These thoughts are not offered as a prediction. They are offered,
rather, as a note of caution. The Paetzold and Willborn analysis of
245. Wards Cove Packing Co., 490 U.S. at 651-52 (emphasis added).

246. See Allen v. Seidman, 881 F.2d 375, 378-79 (7th Cir. 1989) (suggesting this stratification
reading but finding adequate homogeneity under the circumstances of the case). But see Mozee
v. American Commercial Marine Serv. Co., 940 F.2d 1036, 1049-50 (7th Cir. 1991) (suggesting

that qualification requirements must in fact be used by employer to be taken into account in
establishing qualified labor pool).
247. Allen et al., supra note 19, at 177.
248. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971).

249. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
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stratification is persuasive given its premises about the functions of
the impact model and may well prevail in doctrine. If it prevails, the
result, absent a further doctrinal shift from a relaxed to a strict version
of business necessity, would remain incoherent. However, this incoherence would not undermine the consistency of the Paetzold and
Willborn analysis with an equal achievement premise (even if a
"rough" one). The cautionary note is that the premises remain in
dispute.
B. Concurrence
A similar cautionary note regarding concurrence is warranted. The
Paetzold and Willborn analysis of concurrence is again persuasive
given a premise of commitment to a "rough" version of equal achievement. In short, Paetzold and Willborn would interpret the Civil
Rights Act of 1991's requirement that "particular" criteria be identified and causation established (unless criteria are not "capable of separation for analysis") as permitting a disparate impact model attack
on any disparity, whether observed only when criteria are considered
jointly, observed only when not considered jointly, or observed both
when considered separately and jointly.2 50
Although predicated on an excellent analysis of the ambiguities of
the 1991 Civil Rights Act, a number of the Paetzold and Willborn conclusions are debatable. First, consider Reactionary Justice's potential
response to the situation in which neither of two distinct criteria (e.g.,
a high-school-diploma requirement and a five-year-experience requirement) produce a disparate effect when considered separately but
jointly produce such an effect. 251 It makes sense to treat the joint operation of such criteria as a "barrier" subject to the impact model if
one is engaged in banning practices inconsistent with one's distributive objectives, but this is not Reactionary's enterprise. Reactionary
might therefore be inclined to view the criteria as "capable of separation for analysis" (as evidenced by data indicating an absence of separate effects) 25 2 and to further view the impact model as limited to
attacks on distinct criteria. Consider, however, whether Reactionary
might entertain an approximated disparate treatment rationale for
considering joint effects. It might be the case that joint effects are not
apparent and, therefore, give rise to no inference of pretext, but it
250. Paetzold & Willborn, supra note 1, at 380-87.
251. This is Paetzold and Willborn's "cell 5." Id. at 381.
252. This assumes the availability of data for establishing the absence of separate disparate
effects.
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might also be the case that they are apparent and do give rise to such
253
an inference.
Second, and assuming that Paetzold and Willborn are correct in
their view that joint or concurrent effect should be subject to attack
even where separate effect is absent, their contention regarding application of business necessity to this situation may be debated. The contention is that the employer cannot justify joint effect by justifying the
criteria separately, but must justify "use of the components together. '254 The rationale is that permitting separate justification permits use of redundant criteria: "the second criterion added to the first
does not increase overall usefulness of the selection process to the
employer. '255 It may or may not be the case that a second criterion
adds little by way of utility to the employer to the first, and this is the
point of Paetzold and Willborn: the employer should prove that it
adds more utility. The authors say that their justification of a joint
effect proposition follows from their anti-barriers rationale, 256 and it
perhaps does. Consider, however, whether it might not also follow
from a suspected disparate treatment rationale. If it is in fact the case
that the second criterion adds nothing to the first, this absence of joint
utility raises at least an inference that status is an explanation of joint
effect. Which of these (anti-barriers or suspected disparate treatment)
explanations of a justification of joint effect requirement would best
fit such a requirement turns on just how much additional utility the
employer must derive from the second criterion. Paetzold and
Willborn's willingness to reject "slight improvement in prediction" as
a justification for joint effect 257 may be consistent with the distributional objectives of a rough equal achievement explanation, but this is
because of the standard of justification they would invoke, not the
meaning of impact they advocate.
Third, and most crucial, the notion that the joint effects of criteria
that generate no separate effects are subject to attack appears inconsistent, as Paetzold and Willborn apparently recognize, 258 with an employer defense created by the 1991 Civil Rights Act. Under the Act, if
an employer "demonstrates that a specific employment practice does
not cause the disparate impact, the [employer] shall not be required to
253. See Paetzold & Willbom, supra note 1, at 373.

254. Id. at 385. The authors say this with respect to a "cell 6 situation," but cell 6 entails
neither separate nor joint impact. Id. at 381. 1 am therefore assuming a typographical error and

that they mean "cell 5."
255. Id. at 385 n.200.
256. Id. at 385.
257. Id. at 385 n.200.
258. Id. at 386.
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demonstrate that such practice is required by business necessity. 12 59
Unless the combined use of separate criteria is deemed the "specific
practice" of which an employer must make this demonstration, the
quoted provision would seem to exclude the joint or concurrent effect
situation from the scope of the impact model.
Paetzold and Willborn view this employer defense as inconsistent
with the anti-barrier view. 260 It may also be inconsistent with an approximated disparate treatment view. In the first place, as indicated
above, joint effects may plausibly be seen to be within the scope of the
approximation rationale. In the second, the quoted employer defense
would seem to reinforce the Paetzold and Willborn contention that
another situation, one in which separate criteria used in combination
produce no disparate effect but when considered in isolation produce
an effect, is subject to the impact model.261 This latter situation is a
variation on Connecticut v. Teal, the precedent most embarrassing for
of
an approximated disparate treatment rationale conceived in terms 263
pretext.262 It is also the situation, noted by Paetzold and Willborn,
in which employers are least likely to have been aware of disparate
effect and, therefore, least likely to have adopted a criterion "because
of" that effect.
Happily, at least for this writer, this embarrassment is not one for
an incoherence thesis. The quoted employer defense then merely suggests, as would seem obvious in any event, that Congress is no less
subject than the judiciary to the clash of political moralities underlying
incoherence.
CONCLUSION

There is an honorable tradition, particularly among law professors,
of making sense of seemingly confused and contradictory tendencies
within law by reducing them to a few articulable principles and reconciling the seeming confusion to those principles. Both Deconstructing
DisparateImpact and A Positive Theory of Employment Discrimination Cases are significant and valuable contributions within this
tradition.
There is also a counter-tradition, one that attempts the "deconstruction" (in a sense distinct from the Paetzold and Willborn usage) of the
first, often in service of reaffirming confusion. The incoherence thesis
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.

Civil Rights Act (Title VII) § 703(K)(1)(B)(ii), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(B)(ii) (1994).
Paetzold & Willborn, supra note 1, at 384.
Id. at 381-82.
See Cox, Substance and Process, supra note 23, at 45-53.
Paetzold & Willborn, supra note 1, at 372-73.
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defended here is perhaps a species of this counter-tradition, albeit not
from the political perspective commonly associated with it. The
counter-tradition need not imply disrespect for the tradition; indeed,
the tradition and counter-tradition are mutually dependent.
It should also be apparent that underlying tradition and countertradition there are agendas. This is true of the incoherence thesis, or,
at least, what I have come to believe of the incoherence thesis. The
agenda underlying the incoherence thesis, if accepted, would create
coherence through substantial pruning of precedent. The result would
no doubt then become itself a target of other forms of deconstruction
from the perspective of a distinct agenda. It is in my view unfortunate
when tradition and counter-tradition, agenda and counter-agenda, appear not merely in the law reviews but in the cases as well. It is perhaps, however, unfortunate in much the same way that scarcity is
unfortunate-a matter to be regretted only by reference to utopian
musings. In any event, the phenomenon has at least the (debatable)
virtue of keeping legal academics in business.

